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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) present special problems for security. This dissertation
examines the cyber security problem, the physical security problem, the security problems
presented when cyber systems and physical systems are intertwined, and problems presented
by the fact that CPS leak information simply by being observed. The issues presented
by applying traditional cyber security to CPS are explored and some of the shortcomings
of these models are noted. Specific models of a “drive-by-wire” automobile connected
to a road side assistance network, a “Stuxnet type” attack, the smart grid, and others are
presented in detail.
The lack of good tools for CPS security is addressed in part by the introduction
of a new model, Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility over an Event System, or
MSDND(ES). The drive-by-wire automobile is studied to show how MSDND(ES) is
applied to a system that traditional security models do not describe well.
The issue of human trust in inherently vulnerable CPS with embedded cyber monitors,
is also explored. A Stuxnet type attack on a CPS is examined using both MSDND(ES)
and Belief, Information acquisition, and Trust (BIT) logic to provide a clear and precise
method to discuss issues of trust and belief in monitors and electronic reports. To show
these techniques, the electrical smart grid as envisioned by the Future Renewable Electric
Energy Delivery and Management Systems Center (FREEDM) project is also modeled.
Areas that may lead to the development of additional tools are presented as possible
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1. INTRODUCTION
This work was inspired by a life-long interest in “locks” and “keys” of various sorts.
The problem of keeping the bad guys out is a major part of my career. As security officer
for various organizations, I was responsible for electronic security for all of the data centers
where I worked. The constant announcements that the security problem was solved once
and for all by an industry expert’s software re-enforced a deep and abiding skepticism with
security as a whole. My experience in my career with security that almost worked led
eventually to the present work.
The papers that make up the bulk of this dissertation should be viewed in light of the
hidden fear inside every security officer that somewhere there is a hole, a gap, an innocent
observable result, or that nebulous “something” that gives the adversary the information to
take what they will. These papers build towards the final result that, at least in CPS, security
does not work in the sense that most people think it does. Perfect security is highly unlikely
in CPS and may be cost prohibitive. It may be more realistic to try for the ideal while
recognizing the limitations of CPS security. These systems will most likely be breached.
The first paper in this effort is Modeling and reasoning about the security of drive-by-
wire automobile systems [1]. This paper examines the drive-by-wire automobile attached
to a corporate network such as General Motors OnStar. This work leads naturally to A
Multiple Security Domain Model of a Drive-by-Wire System [2] that introduces Multiple
Security Domains Nondeducibility (MSDND)(ES) as a model to handle information flows
that cannot be modeled with traditional methods. During the work on these two papers,
concerns over applying MSDND(ES) to another model such as Stuxnet and how to describe
the roll of trust in these attacks lead to a third paper, A Modal Model of Stuxnet Attacks on
Cyber-Physical Systems: A Matter of Trust.
Work on the smart grid has pointed out the usefulness of the physical side of the CPS
to verify the cyber side and to point out some of the weaknesses of the system, and in the
2fourth paper Breaking Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility on the Smart Grid [3].
Security may not work to completely protect a CPS, but we can use security models to find
weaknesses. Hopefully, we can then safeguard them and nullify some attacks.
1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Security models designed for purely cyber systems or those designed for purely
physical systems do not work effectively to discuss CPS. The tools developed in the past
are not adequate; newer and more targeted tools must be developed. This work presents
MSDND(ES)as new tool to examine CPS. With this new model, it is possible to describe
CPS that cannot easily be modeled otherwise.
The simple act of observing the CPS leads to information leaks. CPS of interest
normally cannot be hidden nor can the human activities around them. Information leakage
via physical observation is subtle and causes unavoidable and unnoticed security issues. A
strong case can be made that a CPS cannot be completely secured [4].
One of the major problems with CPS is that the cyber system is tightly coupled, or
intertwined, with the physical system. Not only must the cyber system be secured, the
physical system must also be protected. Much effort can be placed into securing both
systems only to overlook the interface between the two, but these very difficulties can
possibly be leveraged to use the physically observable parts of the CPS to verify the cyber
parts of the system. Some examples of using the physical side to verify the cyber side will
be presented in Sections 6 and 7.
1.2. PROBLEMS SPECIFIC TO CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
In this work, the problems specific to CPS will be examined. By modeling CPS using
the previously available models, the weaknesses and problems with underlying assumptions
of these models will become apparent. This does not mean those models are useless when
dealing with CPS, far from it. The earlier models are still useful in defining the structure of
a CPS and may assist in finding and examining weaknesses in our systems. However, the
3existing models do not serve well in terms of actually discovering all threats or in designing
systems and procedures to provide adequate security, nor do they provide assistance in
explaining why such threats exist. Since absolute security does not exist with CPS; the
field must evolve towards resilience in the face of security breaches. Breaches will happen.
1.3. RELATED WORK
1.3.1. Historical Security Tools. In Section 2, some early security models [5] are
examined in the light of cyber systems. The HRU model is discussed briefly as a tool to
isolate the actors of interest into subjects and objects. The BLP and Lipner models are
presented as a way to begin to structure the security domains and to begin to understand
the possible information flows in a particular CPS. In practice, this is a difficult part of the
modeling of any CPS. Often these steps are repeated in a process of continual refinement of
the model.
1.3.2. Information Flow Security Models. Once the subject/object and security
domain structure is well understood, the information flow [6] over the Event System (ES) of
the model can be mapped. Traditionally, Information Flow Security (IFS) can be examined
using a wide range of different models and hybrids of those models. Among the most useful
of these for CPS are Noninterference, Noninference [7], and Sutherland’s Nondeducibility
(ND)(ES) [8]. These will be described in detail in Section 2.
1.3.3. Sutherland’s Nondeducibility (ND). Introduced by Sutherland in 1986 [8],
ND is described in the literature from two different viewpoints which are both explored
in this work. The trace based view, see Section 2.3.1 is easier to understand but in some
cases less useful than the frame based version. The frame based version introduced by
Sutherland is more suited to the analysis of CPS and is discussed briefly in Section 2.3.2.
While the concepts are similar, there are striking differences that are sometimes critical to
the description of a specific system. Equivalent descriptions of a CPS will be obtained by
4using either the trace based or frame based version, but it is not uncommon for one method
to be more direct than the other.
1.4. METHODOLOGY
The basics of Belief, Information transfer, and Trust (BIT) logic are introduced in
Section 3. The most often overlooked issue in research concerning security and CPS is how
to deal with the fact that an “agent”, human or computer, in some sense must believe and
trust other agents [9] [10]. BIT logic is a doxastic modal logic1, not a propositional logic,
and deals with belief and trust in a logical statement ϕ rather than whether a statement
is true or false. The BIT logic is strictly concerned with the state of mind of an agent’s
understanding of the truth value of a statement and must not be confused with the actual
truth value of the statement. The BUT logic is essentially the same as the BIT logic, but is
concerned with publicly broadcasts of information rather than BIT logic’s private transfer
from agent j to agent i.
Section 3 presents the underlying modal framework for the rest of this work as well
as the axiomatic system used, see Table 3.1. Kripke frames [11] [12] and models built upon
those frames are key to the understanding of Sutherland’s ND [8]. While the explanation is
brief, it should provide enough background to grasp the important aspects of ND. Finally,
the basic definition of MSDND [2] is presented from a modal viewpoint. Multiple Security
Domains ND and the application of BIT Logic to CPS are the heart of this work. MSDND
provides a tool to examine real CPS that are usually less than perfectly defined. With this
1The BIT operators, Bi, Ii,j , and Ti,j are the doxastic equivalents of the more familiar ◻ operator.
5tool comes the beginnings of a more realistic view of complex security models and CPS and
then moves towards a more realistic view of what security can and cannot do.
1.5. RESEARCH DIRECTION AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 are distilled from published papers. The first paper,
Modeling and Reasoning about the Security of Drive-by-wire Automobile Systems, raised
three questions:
1. What can be done to deal with cases where Sutherland’s ND does not apply due to
constraints or the lack of valuations in the description of the CPS?
2. How can issues with trust be described precisely?
3. Can the physical side of a CPS be used to verify the cyber side?
To make the evolution of this work easier to follow, the map in Figure 1.1 should be
helpful. In short, the questions raised in the first paper, Modeling and Reasoning about
the Security of Drive-by-wire Automobile Systems[1], related to applying ND to the drive-
by-wire car led directly to the development of MSDND in the second paper, A Multiple
Security Domain Model of a Drive-by-Wire System. MSDND led directly to the Stuxnet
paper, A Modal Model of Stuxnet Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems: A Matter of Trust
and the introduction of BIT logic provided a way to describe the role of trust in the attack.
Corollary 6.6.1 hinted at using the problematic intertwining of the cyber and physical
systems as a method to break Nondeducibility and make the attack visible.
All of these questions and new methods were then applied to the electrical smart grid
in the final paper, Physical Attestations, Nondeducibility, and the Smart Grid, which uses
the new MSDND model to describe that CPS.
1.6. DRIVE-BY-WIRE AUTOMOBILE
In Section 4, a specific CPS is modeled using the traditional tools [1]. The automobile
is modeled in three different modes: Normal operations, hazardous road conditions, and
6• Prius (1)










• Smart Grid (4)
• MSNDN everywhere 
• ND issues at edges
• Physical Attestation
Figure 1.1. Flow of Questions Raised in Drive-by-Wire Paper
remote control via a manufacturer’s network connection. The model is built by applying
increasingly more sophisticated security models and the strengths and weaknesses of each
is presented. The security models presented are HRU, BLP, Lipner Model (Lipner), and
three IFS models. The IFS models look at Noninterference, Noninference, and trace-based
Sutherland ND. This section not only presents the analysis of a real CPS but also presents
the beginnings of an algorithm to analyze a generic CPS.
1.7. MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAINS NONDEDUCIBILITY
MSDND(ES) was developed to address situations where Sutherland’s ND applies as
well as those where ND should apply but there are problems. MSDND(ES) is defined and
7explained fully in Section 5. Some problems that arise when attempting to secure CPS are
also explored in Section 5.
1.8. STUXNET TYPE ATTACKS ON CPS AND TRUST
In Section 6, MSDND(ES) is used to model [13] the new threat posed by an
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) [14] such as Stuxnet [15]. The goal is not to do another
detailed analysis of Stuxnet itself, but rather to try and model such a threat from an IFS
viewpoint [16]. In Section 4, it is mentioned that trust plays a key role [17] in attacks on
CPS, yet there are few tools to precisely define trust let alone discuss mathematically trust
and belief. A new tool, the BIT logic [9] developed by Liau has great promise in this area.
BIT logic includes two concepts of a liar which are useful in the analysis of CPS. Many
different types of social engineering attacks could be described more clearly, and more
compactly, using BIT logic.
1.9. MSDND(ES) AND TRUST IN THE SMART GRID
MSDND is used in Section 7 to model the smart grid with Distributed Grid
Intelligence (DGI) as envisioned by the Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and
Management Systems Center (FREEDM) project [18]. One of the more commonly studied
attacks on the smart grid is the fake power injection attack. The MSDND(ES) nature of
the attack is viewed from the cyber messaging viewpoint and the physical measurements
of voltage, current, and phase angle on a common distribution bus and is shown to be
nondeducible. However, using the approach of physical attestation [19], the dependency
of the physical measurements upon known system characteristics and the monitored cyber
8messages can be used to break the MSDND(ES) nature of the attack to reveal the malicious
node.
1.10. DISCUSSION
Some “thought experiments”, gedankenversuch2, in the Section 9 present the ideas of
Nondeducibility and information flow security in a clear and easy to understand manner.
Some additional topics are briefly discussed to further expand upon the ideas developed
during the course of these studies. These include a number of different ways to understand
the relationship of MSDND(ES) to other security models along with some of the advantages
of using MSDND(ES).
Finally, MSDND is discussed in the light of semantic distance and levels of
abstraction. More work needs to be done in these areas, but there is the promise of new uses
of MSDND as a method to model more complex information flows across not only security
domains but across levels of abstraction such as encountered in recent work with Cyber-
Physical Systems in Critical Systems Heuristics (CPS-CSH). In CPS-CSH systems become
terribly complex with information flows between levels of abstractions of the system which
are very difficult to model. There are many opportunities for further research in the area of
CPS-CSH.
2Gedankenversuch is German for “thought experiment”. Many “experiments” in quantum mechanics can




2.1.1. HRU. The HRU [20] is mechanically simple. It consists of a matrix of
Subjects, Objects, and Commands [21]. Each element contains the rights for a pair of
subjects, objects, or subject and object. This matrix is called the HRU Access Control
Matrix (ACM).
The contents of each element of the matrix are manipulated by way of a simple set of
commands in either of the two forms:
Algorithm 1 HRU Conditional Command
HRU conditional command α(X1,X2, . . . ,Xk)




Algorithm 2 HRU Unconditional Command





In an HRU command, the only allowed statements are: enter, delete, create subject,
create object, destroy subject, destroy object. A procedure may consist of multiple
commands, but each command has this very simplistic structure.
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The goal of the HRU model is to provide a structure that can emulate the desired rights
structure and characteristics while still being simple enough to lend itself to mathematical
analysis. Usually the goal is to show that all such structures are members of the set of all
Turing machines.
While the commands and Access Control Matrix are easy to understand and simple to
manipulate, applying the HRU Model to a specific situation is challenging. The real world
model may map easily onto the HRU model without being of much direct use in regards to
modeling CPS. HRU was intended to be used to model access controls not IFS. However,
it is an excellent starting point in understanding the basics of a model of a CPS
2.1.2. BLP. A classical BLP model [7] is composed of distinct security levels [22]
with each subject or object assigned to an appropriate security level. During the operation of
the model, information flows from more secure levels to the less secure levels [23]. Higher
levels in the BLP model are said to dominate lower levels, and BLP rights depend solely
on this relationship. The BLP model also introduces two new rights concepts, the Simple
Security Property (SSP) and the Star Property (*property). The SSP prohibits the reading
of any object or subject at a higher level. The *property prohibits the writing of any object
or subject at a lower level.
2.1.3. Lipner Model. The Lipner model [24] [7] changes the BLP model into a model
of trust in the form of integrity levels and integrity compartments which act much like BLP
security levels and security domains. The policy of most interest in this dissertation is the
ring policy form of the Lipner model, which adds three new rules:
1. Any subject s ∈ S may read any object o ∈ O regardless of the integrity levels
i(s), i(o) ∈ I .
2. s ∈ S can write to o ∈ O if and only if i(o) ≤ i(s).
3. s1 ∈ S can execute s2 ∈ S if and only if i(s2) ≤ i(s1).
The Lipner model adds the element of trust when used with the BLP model. This
allows the system to be described in terms of the integrity or the amount of trust placed
11
in each of the levels. It should be noted that the integrity levels can be independent of the
security levels of the BLP model.
2.2. INFORMATION FLOW SECURITY MODELS
2.2.1. Noninterference. Noninterference is concerned with actions and events
leading to the unintended flow of information from one security domain to another, for
example from HIGH to LOW. For the purposes of Noninterference, an action is any act by a
subject that causes a change in the rights or states of another subject or object (subjects may
initiate actions directly where objects may not). An event is the result of an action where
there is an input, an output, a change in the state of the system, or a change in the rights of
an object or subject. For example, if a subject grants another subject the rights to read the
contents of a write-only object myfile, changing the file from “WRITEONLY” to “READ”
is an “action”. The change in the rights to the object, i.e. the second subject may now read
the file when it could not before, is an “event”. An action or event does not need to be
directly observable in any physical sense, as this example shows. Changing a bit in memory
is an action even if we cannot see any change in the physical memory with the naked eye.
Informally, Noninterference (NI) [25] [26] [27] [28] holds when an entity with low
security sees the exact same actions or events whether or not high level events are taken into
account. In other words, the information seen by the low level entity is the same before and
after all high level events are deleted. This can be shown by comparing the trace of events
seen by the low level when all actions occur to the trace of events seen by the low level after
all high level actions and high level events have been removed from the trace. If the trace
seen by the low level entity with all high level actions and events exactly matches the trace
seen by the low level entity with all the high level actions and event removed, the system is
secure under Noninterference with respect to those actions and events. A formal treatment
of Noninterference will now be given.
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Definition 1. Security Levels
With no loss of generality, the system is divided into two security levels. The level
examined for noninterference will be denoted by Lower security partition (LOW) and all
higher security levels will be denoted by Higher security partition (HIGH). Multiple security
levels can be examined pairwise sequentially using this convention.
Definition 2. Commands
Let the set of all commands be Z = {c0, c1, . . .}.
A specific sequence of commands is denoted as cs = {c0, c1, . . . , cn}.
Definition 3. Possible states of the system
The set of all possible states of the system is Σ = {σ0, σ1, . . . , σn} where σ0 is some
initial state and σi is the ith state of the system.
Definition 4. Trace (T )
The list of all events seen at a particular security level, e.g., HIGH, is denoted as TH .
Likewise, the list of all events seen at a set of multiple security levels is denoted as T2,3
where 2 and 3 are the security levels. All traces are ordered sets of events. Also:
T (c0, σ0) = σ1 (2.1)
T (ci+1, σi+1) = T (ci+1, T (c1, σi)) (2.2)
.
Definition 5. Outputs
The set of outputs from a sequence of commands is given by O = {o1, o2, . . . , on}. A
specific ordered set of outputs will be denoted as P ∗(cs, σi).
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Definition 6. Purge Operator π
The Purge Operator removes all actions by a specific entity. For example, to remove
all the actions by subject A the purge function is denoted as πA.
Definition 7. Projection Operator Proj(. . .)
The Projection Operator produces the set of events that a subject or object is allowed
to see. This is denoted as Proj(s, cs, σi)→ P ∗(cs, σi).
Definition 8. Noninterference (NI)
With respect to a subject, A, commands are NI secure withG′ users or subjects (A,G ∶
∣G′) if and only if:
• ∀cs ∈ c∗ and s ∈ G′
• proj(s, cs, σi) = proj(s, πG(cs, σi)
or
• output(cs,G′) =output(purge(cs,G),G′)
2.2.2. Noninference. Like Noninterference, the notion of Noninference (NF) [7]
is concerned with information flow. Informally, the NF property holds when a low level
observer cannot correctly determine if a result of an event is caused by a high level event or
a low level event.
Definition 9. Security Levels
A system can be divided into two security levels without any loss of generality. The
level being examined for Noninference (and later for Nondeducibility) is denoted as LOW.
All higher security levels are denoted as HIGH. Multiple security levels can be examined
one at a time using this convention.
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Definition 10. Commands
The set of all commands is Z = {c0, c1, . . .}. A specific sequence of commands is
given by cs = {c0, c1, . . . , cn}.
Definition 11. Possible system states
The set of possible states of the system is given by Σ = {σ0, σ1, . . . , σn} where σ0 is
an initial state and σi is the ith state of the system.
Definition 12. Event system
An event system (ES) is the set of all events in the model.
Definition 13. Trace
The set of valid traces in the system is denoted as Tr. A valid trace is denoted as τ .
Definition 14. Trace restrictor
The trace restrictor operator τ ↑ E removes all events other than those in the set of
events E as seen by a specific observer.
Definition 15. Noninference Secure
A system is Noninference Secure (NF) if
NF(ES) ≡ ∀τ ∈ Tr ∶ (τ ↑ L) ↑H = ∅ (2.3)
where τ ↑ L is a valid trace.
To prove Noninference holds, it is necessary to prove that:
• τ ↑ L ∈ Tr ∶ τ ↑ L is a valid trace in the system
• (τ ↑ L) ↑H = ∅.
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The first condition states that if only the low level events in the trace are examined,
then the result is a possible set of events that makes sense when applied to the cyber-physical
system. The second condition states that if the low level events are examined and the trace is
restricted to only high level events, then the resulting trace is empty. There can be no events
in the trace that leak information from the high level to the low level. Both conditions must
hold in order to prove Noninference.
2.3. SUTHERLAND’S NONDEDUCIBILITY (ND)
While Sutherland ND(ES) was originally introduced from a modal viewpoint [8], it is
given here from both the modal view and a trace viewpoint [29]. The differences, and the
issues arising from those differences, are discussed later in Section 2.3.3.
The property of Nondeducibility(ND) [7] holds if what is observed at a low level is
consistent with any number of high level actions. Therefore, no information is leaked to the
low level.
Table 2.1. Trace Operators and Terms for ND(ES)
TL denotes the set of all possible finite sequences of low level events that are legal.
ES denotes the set of possible events.
HI denotes all HIGH-level inputs.
LI denotes all LOW-level inputs.
HO denotes all HIGH-level outputs.
LO denotes all LOW-level outputs.




A system is Nondeducibility secure (ND) if:
ND(ES) = ∀τL, τH ∈ Tr ∶ ∃τ ∈ Tr ∶ τ ∣L = τL∣L ∧ τ ∣HI = τH ∣H. (2.4)
2.3.2. Modal ND(ES). In the Sutherland model, the valuation functions are the same
for all entities in the same security domain. Given a generic case with two valuations, V1(w)
and V2(w), the definition of Sutherland Nondeducibility [30] with respect to the valuation,
V2 for the model is:
ND(ES) = (∀w ∈W ∶ V2(w), V1(w) ≠ ∅)(∃w
′
∶ [V1(w) = V1(w
′
)] ∧ [V2(w) = V2(w
′
)]). (2.5)
If the two domains are not equal, as in HIGH and LOW, a slightly modified version of
equation 2.5 may be used:
ND(ES) = (∀z ≠ ∅ ∶ V −11 (z) = w ∈W )(∃w
′
∈W ∶ [V1(w
′) = z] ∧ [V2(w) = V2(w
′
)]). (2.6)
2.3.3. Trace Based Verses Modal Frame Based Sutherland Nondeducibility.
There is an important difference between the Sutherland Nondeducibility from a trace
analysis and the more useful modal frame viewpoint. In a frame, such as defined earlier
in Section 3.2, time can be thought of as simply one of the state variables changing in an
ordered manner. The state of ND(ES) can be evaluated via the frame based model as the
system progresses. A modal frame model is not reduced to analyzing the past behavior of
the system or rerunning the system to compare traces. Instead it is possible to analyze the
state of the system at any time. Indeed, time in the traditional sense is not an issue. It is
important to understand that the final results of trace based or frame based ND(ES) will be
the same. A set of events in a system are ND(ES) or they are not. Indeed, some systems




Developing a security model is part methodology and part art. The problem lies in the
fact that information is always viewed in light of an existing mind frame. The internal
mental framework of the analyst can cloud the details and shortcomings of a security
model. The art lies in catching these internal blind spots before they can be exploited by an
adversary.
To aid in the creation of a model of a CPS, an algorithm is presented. These
algorithms are designed to lead a team of analysts through the process. At first glance, the
algorithms appear to endlessly circle around the problem without making much progress.
Unfortunately, this is a possible outcome of a team analysis. If done properly, the process
refines the model over and over until a strong model is developed.
The first algorithm, Algorithm 3 CONTINUALREFINEMENT, is an overview of the
basic procedure to build and refine a model. In reality, the process is one of continual
refinement and usually will involve retracing steps already completed. This should not be
discouraged, but it is entirely possible a team could get caught in the details and lose sight
of the eventual goal of developing a CPS model. Hopefully, the algorithm will lead to a
spiraling in on the final model instead of a constant circling around the same steps.
The second algorithm, Algorithm 4 CYBERSECURITY, provides a method to build
the cyber side of the model using traditional security methods. While this dissertation has
shown such a model is not complete for a CPS, it is a necessary first step. Building a cyber
side model is essential to determining what entities are important to the model. At each step
refinements to the model may require the team or analyst to retrace their work back to the
HRU question of what are the subject and object of the model. As the model is refined,
these return steps should become a matter of checking to insure the refinements have not
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created new issues for HRU or the other traditional models. At the end of each return to the
algorithm, the result should be a well defined model of the cyber security side of the CPS.
The next algorithm, Algorithm 5 PHYSICALSECURITY, depends highly on the actual
CPS. Some systems will be self-contained or within a highly controlled environment, but
most CPS are distributed over a significant distance. With such systems it is critical to
include in the models any communications system such as Virtual Private Network (VPN)
built over the INTERNET. Physical security must take into account the fact that all CPS can
be observed to some extent. Fortunately, physical security and physical attacks are relatively
well understood.
Algorithm 3 CPS Security Methodology
1: procedure CONTINUALREFINEMENT
2: refinements = true











Algorithm 4 Cyber System Security
1: procedure CYBERSECURITY(refinements)
2: procedure HRU MODEL(actors)
3: Identify and refine subjects and objects
4: Build or refine possible event system (ES)






SDi = security universe
7: procedure BLP MODEL(traditional Security Domains)
8: Identify and refine security domains
9: if any subject or object changed then
10: refinements:=true
11: restart HRU Model
12: end if
13: procedure LIPNER(Trust Compartments)
14: Identify and refine trust compartments
15: if any subject or object changed then
16: refinements:=true
17: restart HRU Model
18: end if
19: if any security departments changed then
20: refinements:=true






Algorithm 5 Physical Security
1: procedure PHYSICALSECURITY(refinements)
2: Identify and refine physical security issues
3: Identify and refine opportunities for physical monitors
4: Identify and refine opportunities for physical attestation
5: if changes then




Algorithm 6 Cyber-Physical Interface Security
1: procedure CYBER-PHYSICALINTERFACESECURITY(refinements)
2: Identify existing physical monitors
3: Identify useful observations3
4: Identify and refine opportunities for physical attestation
5: if changes then
6: refinements:=true ▷ Back up to HRU and refine model again
7: end if
8: end procedure
Algorithm 7 Trust Security
1: procedure TRUSTSECURITY(refinements)
2: Identify and refine agents ▷ subject are often agents
3: Examine model for physical attestations
4: Examine model for cyber attestations
5: if changes then ▷ Back up to HRU and refine model
6: refinements:=true ▷ Back up to HRU and refine model
7: end if
8: end procedure
Algorithm 8 Build a Modal Model
procedure BUILDMODALMODEL(refinements)
Determine which questions, ϕ, are relevant
Develop valuations for ϕ
if /∃ VSDϕ (w) then
Try to develop MSDND(ES)
end if





Algorithm 9 Explore Known Attacks on Similar CPS
procedure KNOWNATTACKS(refinements)
Literature search ▷ Look for attack on similar CPS
if new attack found then
Review results of CyberSecurity
Review physical attestation
if cbyer security changes then
refinements:=true
restart Cyber Security
else if physical security changes then
refinements:=true
restart Physical Security
else if interface changes then
refinements:=true







3.2. MODAL FRAMES AND LOGIC SYSTEM
3.2.1. Modal Logic Models over Frames. The modal models in this dissertation
are built over generalized Kripke frames [11] [33] [12] [34] and require at least some
background in modal logic. This section will present an overview of Kripke frames and
the axiomatic system used throughout this dissertation.
The set of worlds, {wi ∈W ∶ i = 0,1, . . . , n} can be thought of as all possible
combinations of m boolean state variables s0, s1, . . . , sm.
The possible worlds are connected by a completely populated set of transitions,
{wRw′}, where R+sx sets the state variable, sx = ⊺(“true”) and similarly, R−sx sets the
state variable, sx = (“false”). For example, the change of a state variable sx leads to an
irreducible ‘jump’ from world wsx+ to world wsx− [35]. This defines the effect of changing




where all other state variables retain their current values and si = ⊺ regardless of the
previous value of si. R−sx is viewed in a similar fashion as setting the state variable, sx to
“false” and leaving all other variables unchanged in the transition, wRw′, from world w to
w
′
. This could result in a transition from one world, w, back to the same world, i.e. wRw4.
Transitions of the type wRw′ = ∅ can be disallowed without any loss of generality5. This
simply states that transitions must move from one world in the frame to another world in the
frame, i.e., state changes cannot transition out of the set of all possible worlds W . Together,
the set of worlds and transitions define a frame, F = {W,R} [36].
At this point it is helpful to informally define some modal logic symbols. The terms
“models” and “satisfied” in this usage is the same as in SATISFIES problems.
◻ϕ ϕ is always true here
◇ϕ ϕ might be true here
w ⊢ ϕ in w,ϕ is the conclusion of a valid proof
w ⊧ ϕ in w, states are such that ϕ is true, i.e. ϕ is “satisfied” in world w
BIT The BIT/BUT operators are explained in Section 3.4
Biϕ Belief is a doxastic version of the ◻ϕ operator.
Ii,jϕ Information transfer is a doxastic version of the ◻ϕ operator.
Ujϕ Utterance is a doxastic version of the ◻ϕ operator.
Ti,jϕ Trust is a doxastic version of the ◻ϕ operator.
Because ◻ and ◇ are duals, only one need be defined and the other can be used as
simply a shorthand. In this dissertation, ◇ϕ will be defined as ∃w ∈ W ∶ w ⊧ ϕ. ◻ϕ then
becomes a shorthand, i.e. ◻ϕ ≡ ∼◇ ∼ϕ. This translates loosely to: “it is such that ϕ is true
everywhere” can be substituted for “it is not possible for ϕ to be false somewhere.”
The set ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ0 is a set of countably many atomic propositions. Questions can be
asked by evaluating well-formed formulas(wff’s) built from these atomic propositions. The
4This is referred to as a Reflexive Frame.
5The frame is a Serial Frame.
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set of well-formed formulas is the least set containing Φ0 that is closed under the following
formulation rules:
• if ϕ is a wff, so are ∼ϕ,◻ϕ, , and ◇ϕ
• if ϕ is a wff, so are Biϕ, and ∼Biϕ,
• if ϕ is a wff, so are Ii,jϕ, and ∼Ii,jϕ,
• if ϕ is a wff, so are Ti,jϕ, and ∼Ti,jϕ,
• if ϕ and ψ are wff, then so is ϕ ∨ψ
• if ϕ and ψ are wff, then so is ϕ ∧ψ
As usual, other classical logical operators ∧ (and), → (material implication), xor
(exclusive OR) and ↔ (if and only if), can be defined as abbreviations. The modal operator,
◻ϕ, is an abbreviation for ∼ ◇ ∼ϕ [12] [11] [37]. Because the modal operators ◻ and ◇
are duals, only one needs to be axiomatically defined. In this dissertation, the ◇ϕ operator
will be the fundamental operator. The axiomatic system is given in Table 3.1. The “K” and
“M” axioms are only required to insure that our axiomatic system is correct and complete in
order to correctly claim the set ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ is closed over the normal propositional operators.
Let {V } be the set of valuation functions such that Visx(w) returns the value of state
variable sx as seen by an entity i in world w, that is, Visx(w) = (sx ∧ ⊺). NOTE: If no
valuation function exists to return the value of a state variable, say si, then our model can
never determine the value of that state variable nor the value of any logical expression
dependent upon that state variable. A model is defined as a tuple M = {F, V } or M =
{W,R,V }.
3.3. TWO MODAL LOGIC BASED MODELS
The classical Sutherland Nondeducibility Model and the Multiple Security Domain
Nondeducibility Model are modal models over frames. Informally, each possible combi-
nation of binary state variables defines a world, w. Changes in any state variable cause a
transition to a different world, much like a labeled transition state machine. A framework
of the possible combinations of states, the transitions between those combinations, and the
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valuation functions for all the states that make up a world, defines the actions of a model. If
built properly, this model should behave in the same manner as the CPS. A series of worlds
and the translations between those worlds makes up an event system, ES.
3.3.1. Modal Logic Model. Recall that the combination of states, s0, s1, . . . , sm are
such that each combination corresponds to a single unique world, w ∈ W . A change in an
state variable moves to a different world, w′ ∈W where all other state variables retain their
values. This transition is unique and is denoted as wRw′ ∈ R. Together, the set of worlds
and transitions define a frame, F = {W,R}.
The set of all valuation functions, {V }, is such that Visx(w) returns the value of state
variable sx as seen by an entity i in worldw. NOTE: If no valuation function exists to return
the value of a state variable, say si, then the model can never determine the value of that
state variable nor the value of any logical expression dependent upon that state variable. A
model is defined as a tuple M = {F, V } or M = {W,R, V }.
3.3.2. Sutherland Nondeducibility Model. In the Sutherland model, the valuation
functions are the same for all entities in the same security domain. Typically, some evalua-
tions are restricted to one domain while others appear to span multiple domains. Consider a
generic case with two valuations, V1(w) and V2(w). Sutherland Nondeducibility [30] with
respect to the valuation, V2 for this model is:
ND(ES) = (∀w ∈W ∶ V2(w),V1(w) ≠ ∅)
∃w
′
∶ [V1(w) = V1(w
′)] ∧ [V2(w) = V2(w
′)]
3.3.3. Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility Model. Computer security tools
work relatively well for computers, but CPS leak information because the physical part of
the system can be watched for changes. By their very nature, CPS are messy from a security
domain view point. Domains overlap, the boundaries are not clean (ideal boundaries cannot
leak information), and outside threats can leak into domains thought to be secure.
25
Computer security tools work best when secure domains are cleanly nested inside less
secure domains like a Medieval castle with its outer walls and interior keep, see Fig. 3.1.
This model serves us well for most uses but breaks down when applied to CPS. Because
CPS typically need to secure both data and information flows, the security domain picture
gets complicated, see Fig. 3.2. We need new models that can model the cyber and physical
components of CPS.
If the system consists of more than two security levels, the assumption is that the
progressively higher security levels are contained within the next lower security level.
Indeed, this model has served well since the advent of the Medieval castle with its outer
walls and interior keep, see Figure 3.1. Unfortunately, this model does not work well for
modern CPS because the security levels often overlap and are rarely entirely contained as in
the case of the Medieval castle and keep system, see Figure 3.2.
Good security models exist for computer systems and access control, but CPS are
more complicated than the computer systems these models were designed to describe.
Information flow security is important and in CPS it is not possible to limit the goal to
simply denying information flows from one security domain to another. The physical nature
of the system leaks information and novel attacks, such as Stuxnet [15] have shown the
limitations of viewing threats as only attempts to steal information. CPS information flow
models must now explore information flow across security domain boundaries as being
critical to the safe operation of the system.
Extending existing models to multiple security domains is problematic. This
dissertation offers a different approach, the Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility
Model. Assume an entity i as any part of the system capable of independent observation
or action. The Event System (ES) divides into multiple security domains, SDi, as viewed
by each entity i in the model. These domains may, or may not, overlap. These multiple




SDi = (ES). (3.1)
∀i, j ∶ 0 < i ≠ j ≤ n ∶ [(SDi ∩ SDj = ∅) ∨ (SDi ∩ SDj ≠ ∅)] (3.2)
.
The first rule states that every event happens in some security domain. Unless
specifically noted, the event system can be thought of as the universe with security domains
being a number of subsets of the universe. Any event that appears to happen outside of the
security domains under examination, explicitly happens in that part of the universe that is
the unknown domain. This unknown domain is those unexamined surroundings in which
our model is defined. For example, an unsuspected adversary in the hills looking down into
the parking lot is in the unknown domain.
The second rule states explicitly that any pair of security domains may overlap, may
be disjoint, or one may be a contained subset of the other. Other IFS models require disjoint
security domains that are separated by an ideal barrier across which no information may
flow in either direction [7]. MSDND(ES) simply requires the security domains be defined.
Definition 17. Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility
There exists some world with a pair of states where one must be true and the other false
(exclusive OR), but an entity i has no valuation function for those states. In security domain
SDi, i simply cannot know which state is true and which is false. MSDND over an ES can
be defined as follows:
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MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈W ∶ w ⊢ ◻ [(sx ∨ sy) ∧ ∼(sx ∧ sy)] ∧ [w ⊧ (/∃ Vix(w)∧ /∃ Viy(w))] .
(3.3)
An equivalent formulation would be:
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈W ∶ w ⊢ ◻ [sx xor sy] ∧ [w ⊧ (/∃ Vix(w)∧ /∃ Viy(w))] . (3.4)
In the special case where sx is ϕ = ⊺ and sy is ∼ϕ = ⊺, MSDND(ES) reduces to:
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈W ∶ w ⊢ ◻ [ϕ xor ∼ϕ] ∧ [w ⊧ (/∃ Viϕ(w))] . (3.5)





Figure 3.1. A Medieval Castle Model of Security
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Theorem 1. Any arbitrary case where ND(ES) holds can be shown to be a special case of
MSDND(ES).
Proof.
Given: A system with two security domains, left and right, and two distinct worlds w′,w′′ ∈
W where ND(ES) holds. NOTE: The use of left and right as designations is to emphasize
that MSDND is not a high/low hierarchy model, but is instead a partitioning model.
With no loss of generality, this valuation can be expressed as a binary decision value because
in the current world, w, either the right event has occurred (w′) or it has not (w′′). Create
two state variables such that st → (w = w′) and sf → (w = w′′). Because this case is
ND(ES), it follows that the left domain cannot evaluate either st or sf because to do














∈W → w ∈W By construction







w ⊧ [/∃ Vleftst (w)∧ /∃ V
left
sf (w)] ND(ES)
Since the first clause is constructed as a tautology, by conjunction we can construct the
conditions for MSDND(ES).
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈W ∶ w′′ ⊢ ◻(st xor sf)w ⊧ (/∃ Vleftst (w)∧ /∃ Vleftsf (w)). (3.6)
3.3.5. Remarks about the Reduction from Sutherland Model to Multiple Security
Domains Model. It is possible to reduce any system that meets ND(ES) to one that
meets MSDND(ES) by defining decision variables for each variable that is ND(ES).
However, a reduction in the other direction, MSDND(ES) to ND(ES) is not always possible.
MSDND(ES) works even in the case where the model under examination does not contain
a valuation function capable of returning the value of ϕ in all worlds. Sutherland’s ND(ES)
does not address this situation.
Furthermore, MSDND(ES) does not depend upon examining two domains nor upon
any relationship between those domains such as low and right. The domains in question
might be one wholly contained in the other, they might overlap, or they might be disjoint.
There is no need to determine in advance what the relationship is between the two, three, or
more domains in question.
3.4. DOXASTIC BIT AND BUT LOGIC
Recall from the earlier discussion of the axiomatic system, see Table 3.1, the two
generic6 modal logic operators ◻ϕ (it must always be true that ϕ) and ◇ϕ (it might be
6Here generic modal logic is a more familiar term for what is properly termed alethic logic.
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true under some conditions that ϕ). These generic modal logic operators often take on
more specific meanings for more specific logics such as temporal logic, deontic logic,
epistemology, and others.
Because ◻ and ◇ are duals, only one need be defined and the other can be used as
simply a shorthand. In this dissertation, ◇ϕ will be defined as ∃w ∈ W ∶ w ⊩ ϕ. ◻ϕ then
becomes a shorthand, i.e., ◻ϕ ≡ ∼◇ ∼ϕ. This translates loosely to: “it is such that ϕ is true
everywhere” can be substituted for “it is not possible for ϕ to be false somewhere.”
BIT and Belief, Utterance, and Trust (BUT) Logic7 were introduced by Liau [9] [40]
to provide a modality to formally reason about belief, information transfer, utterances, and
trust when dealing with cyber entities. While it was developed primarily for handling trust
in database and distributed systems, BIT logic is useful for describing CPS, especially when
humans are involved. Before BIT logic, social engineering attacks could only be described
by a narrative in imprecise language. With BIT logic, spoofing and other unwanted behavior
is described with simple, formal proofs.
BIT logic is designed to reason about the belief and trust an entity i has in information
from an entity j, e.g., the belief and trust an operator has in the reading from a monitoring
station. The doxastic modal operators that correspond to the usual ◻ operator8 are:
• Ti,jϕ defines the trust i has in a report from j that ϕ is true
• Biϕ defines the belief by i that ϕ is true; it does not matter if ϕ is true or not, i believes
it to be true
• Ii,jϕ defines the transfer of information directly from one agent to another9, that is j
reported to i that ϕ is true
• Ujϕ defines the broadcast of information that ϕ is true by an agent j. No efforts are
made to hide the transmission although the actual message may be obscured.
7We will not distinguish between BIT and BUT logic as it will be obvious which we are using.
8For our purposes, we do not need the doxastic versions of ◇.
9If the information is published to the world at large, the Utterance operator, Ujϕ, is used.
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BIT Logic introduces four new modal operators to deal with what agents believe, trust,
and communicate with each other. Great care must be taken to distinguish between what is
true, what is believed to be true, and what reported information is believed and trusted.
3.4.1. Belief. It is critical to remember that belief in the context of doxastic logic
has nothing to do with the notion of the truth of a statement ϕ. An entity believes the truth
of a statement based upon some internal state, not based upon any demonstration or proof
of the actual statement ϕ. In the context of BIT logic, the belief operator, Biϕ, is a variant
of the more familiar modal operator ◻. For simplicity, belief is always absolute and there is
no corresponding operator for the modal ◇ nor does the current work require one.
There is an important distinction between ∼Biϕ (i does not believe ϕ to be true) and
Bi∼ϕ (i believes ∼ϕ to be true). In the first case, i does not believe in the truth of ϕ while in
the second case i is certain that ϕ is false. Again, nothing is said or known about the truth
of ϕ, but i believes in its own knowledge of the state of ϕ.
3.4.2. Information Transfer. The information transfer operator, Ii,jϕ, clearly states
how i gains knowledge of ϕ. The information transfer operator inherently assumes j will
not lie to i; however, this restriction allows liars to lie to trusting agents. It is key to realize
the information is transferred directly to an agent who has no direct way to evaluate whether
or not j is a liar. Whether or not i thinks j is a liar is determined by the Trust operator, but
either way the information is transferred.
There is a difference between the two statements Ii,j∼ϕ (read “j told i that ϕ is not
true”) and ∼Ii,jϕ (read “j did not tell i anything about ϕ). In this case the difference is
obvious, but care must be taken in how information transfer statements are read and used.
3.4.3. Utterances. If information is not transferred directly from agent j to i but is
instead broadcast to any and all agents, the Utterance operator Uj is used to represent the
transfer. For example, if agent j sends up a flare, that information ϕ can be seen by everyone
and is no longer private. The Information transfer operator, Ii,jϕ, is no longer appropriate
and the Utterance operator, Ujϕ, is used instead.
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The statement Ujϕ is interpreted as agent j openly puts the information ϕ out for any
entity to know. Any agent i has no direct way to evaluate whether or not j is a liar. Whether
or not i thinks j is a liar is determined by the Trust operator, but either way the information
is transferred.
The statements Uj∼ϕ (read “j openly said that ϕ is not true”) and ∼Ujϕ (read “j did
not say anything about ϕ) are not the same concept. The differences between these two
statements is easy to understand, but care must be taken not to confuse them.
3.4.4. Trust. The trust operator, Ti,jϕ, is a doxastic modal operator for trust that
corresponds to the ◻ modal operator and is used to describe the internal state of trust that
i has for knowledge about the state of ϕ learned directly from j. Two subtle distinctions
are important here. First, the trust that i has in j about ϕ has no bearing on the trust i
has in j about the state of any other information ψ. Second, trust in a report does not
imply the information has ever been transferred, only that it will be trusted once j actual
makes a report or transfers the information about ϕ. For the purposes of this dissertation,
Ti,jϕ → Ti,j∼ϕ; i.e., if i trusts a positive report it is assumed i will trust a negative report as
well.
The two statements, Ti,j∼ϕ (read “i trusts any report from j that ϕ is not true”) and
∼Ti,jϕ (read “i emphatically does not trust any report from j about ϕ at all”), are not
equivalent in any circumstances. They are contradictory.
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Table 3.1. The Axiomatic System
1. Definition of logical and modal operators (abbreviations)
D1: ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ∼(∼ϕ ∨ ∼ψ)
D2: ϕ xor ψ ≡ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ∼(ϕ ∧ ψ)(Exclusive OR)
D3: ϕ→ ψ ≡ ∼ϕ ∨ ψ
D3: ϕ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)
D4: ◇ϕ ≡ ∃w ∈W ∶ w ⊧ ϕ
D5: ◻ϕ ≡ ∼◇ ∼ϕ
D6: Bi(ϕ) Entity i believes the truth of ϕ
D7: Ii,j(ϕ) Entity j informs i that ϕ ≡ ⊺
D8: Ti,jϕ Entity i trusts the report from j about ϕ
2. Axioms
P: all the tautologies from the propositional calculus
K: ◻(ϕ → ψ)→ (◻ϕ→ ◻ψ)
M: ◻ϕ→ ϕ
S4: ◻ϕ→ ◻◻ ϕ
S5: ◇ϕ→ ◻◇ ϕ
A1: ∼ ◻ϕ→ ◻∼ ◻ ϕ
A2: ◇(ϕ ∨ψ)→◇ϕ ∨◇ψ
A3: ◻ϕ ∧ ◻ψ → ◻(ϕ ∧ ψ)




I1: [Ii,jϕ ∧ Ii,j(ϕ→ ψ)]→ Ii,jψ
I2: ∼Ii,j
C1: BiIi,jϕ ∧ Ti,jϕ→ Biϕ
C2: Ti,jϕ ≡ BiTi,jϕ
3. Rules of Inference [38] [11]
R1: from ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ infer ψ (Modus Ponens)
R2: ∼(ϕ ∧ψ) ≡ (∼ϕ ∨ ∼ψ) (DeMorgan’s)
R3: from ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ ◻ϕ (Generalization)
R4: from ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ infer ⊢ ◻ϕ ≡ ◻ψ
R5: from ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ infer ⊢ Ti,jϕ ≡ Ti,jψ




In this section we will examine the interactions of a network connected drive-by-
wire automobile with a “trusted”10 network for roadside assistance such as General Motor’s
OnStar.
An increasing number of modern automobiles are essentially drive-by-wire systems,
highly computerized, and connected wirelessly to services such as OnStar or Toyota Safety
Connect. While these features enhance automobile safety and reliability, the security impact
is a growing concern. This section examines the security of drive-by-wire automobile
systems. Generic models of access control and information flow are defined, with specific
instances of the 2010 Toyota Prius used where appropriate. The automobile systems are
examined from the viewpoint of the driver with special emphasis on the driver’s ability to
determine who, or what, is actually in control of the automobile in critical situations.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Modern automobiles are essentially drive-by-wire systems connected wirelessly to
manufacturers networks. The security impact of these advanced features is a growing
concern. Three fundamental questions are: (i) what is an appropriate security model for such
systems? (ii) what level of security do such systems provide? and (iii) how does the driver
interact with the automobile and manufacturer? To address these questions, this section
models automobile systems as CPS and applies classical security models of multilevel
access control and information flow security. Compared with information and computer
systems, CPS present an interesting perspective of security from three standpoints. First,
CPS have at their heart a control mechanism that is either a computer system or something
similar; this raises the issue of securing a computer system. Second, the physical side of
a cyber-physical system makes it easy to understand how merely observing the system can
10Here trusted is used in its more general sense and not in the BIT Logic sense.
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leak information; this eases the difficulties of visualizing attacks on the system. Third, CPS
are prone to collateral damage when compromised. It is much easier to see the implications
of a breach when it leads to total destruction of the system rather than simply accessing
a few confidential documents in the case of an information security breach. There are
two important questions to answer. First, why should one analyze how a drive-by-wire
automobile interacts with a remote roadside assistance service offered by the manufacturer?
The answer is that the presence of a drive-by-wire system means that the driver has limited
control of the automobile in certain situations. Indeed, in light of malware such as Stuxnet
[15], an attack on this CPS can have life-threatening consequences. Second, how should
the analysis be done? Why not simply discuss anecdotal evidence? The answer is that
a framework is needed if the system is to be understood objectively. The formal security
models studied in this dissertation support the analysis of the interactions between the driver,
drive-by-wire automobile and remote assistance services. This section specifically considers
the Toyota Safety Connect system, which has many of the same features as the OnStar
system. A prime concern is whether or not the driver can determine if the automobile
is under his/her control, the control of the on-board computer, or under the control of an
external entity. If the driver is not in control, is there anything he or she can safely do? Or
is the driver helpless? We will show that, in some situations, the driver not only has no
control, but that the driver cannot determine who or what has control of the automobile.
More than most current automobile models, the Toyota Prius is a drive-by- wire system.
In fact, other than issuing various requests to the controller area network (CAN), which is
the control mechanism of the Prius, the driver has little to do as far as our security model
is concerned. For example, when the driver steps on the brake pedal, a sensor is activated
that requests the Prius to engage the braking system. There is no mechanical linkage and
no possibility of the driver overriding an errant command or forcing the Prius to obey
some other command. Indeed, the Prius traction control system takes full control of the
accelerator, braking and all other systems from the driver under hazardous road conditions.
Should the Prius determine not to honor a command, the driver has no more control than
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a passenger. This dissertation considers several security models and analyzes three issues
for each model: (i) normal operations that take the automobile from a powered down to
a driving state; (ii) traction control under hazardous road conditions; and (iii) external
(remote) control of the automobile. Special emphasis is placed on the driver’s ability to
determine who, or what, is actually in control of the automobile.
4.2. FUNCTIONAL MODEL
The functional model consists of a corporation that provides services to its automo-
biles in the form of remote assistance (e.g., navigation, remote unlock and remote shutdown)
and an automobile with on-board drive-by-wire functionality (e.g., key fob identification,
normal operations and operation under hazardous road conditions).
4.2.1. Normal Operations. Normal operations of the Toyota Prius are similar to
those of most modern automobiles. When the driver approaches the vehicle, the vehicle
senses the key fob. In the case of the Prius, the driver does not have to depress a button on
the fob to activate the automobile. If the Prius determines that the driver has the correct key
fob, it goes into the pre-operational mode and unlocks the driver side door when the handle
is pulled. The driver can then operate the vehicle.
4.2.2. Hazardous Road Conditions. Since the early 1970s, automobiles have been
equipped with Anti-Lock Braking System (ABS). More recently some automobiles, such as
the Toyota Prius, have been equipped with traction control systems to automatically correct
for loss of traction. These systems can be thought of as a super-set of ABSs and are very
effective. As in the case of an ABS, the first time that a driver experiences a traction control
system, there is a feeling of complete loss of control of the automobile. When the traction
control system is operating, the system overrides any action that the driver takes to protect
the automobile and passengers. In this dissertation, all discussions about traction control
are assumed to apply only to the Toyota Prius.
4.2.3. Remote Shutdown. Many automobile models have the ability to be remotely
disabled. This is intended to assist in recovering a stolen automobile, but it has the
37
potential for misuse [41]. Of particular concern are models, such as the Toyota Prius, that


















Figure 4.1. Schematic Operation of Corporation/Driver/Car Interactions
4.2.4. Remote Operations. If an automobile is equipped with OnStar, Toyota
Safety Connect or some other similar service, the owner must trust the corporation or
service provider. The specific limits of the service often cannot be discerned from the
sales brochure. Also, it can be very difficult to determine if the actions undertaken by
an automobile during its operation are due to traction control, remote corporate operations
or a malfunction. In all three cases, the results can be the same the driver has no control
over the automobile.
4.3. LEAKAGE OF RIGHTS
This section analyzes the leakage of rights using the security models described in the
previous section.
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4.3.1. Subjects, Objects, and Rights.
Subjects:
• Car - The computerized control function of the vehicle.
• Corporation - An entity, or its members, that may be able to control the vehicle
through a wireless link; for example, Toyota Safety Connect[42]. Another example
would be GM OnStar.
• TractionControl (TC) - The vehicular system that takes control of the automobile
under hazardous driving conditions. It includes the more familiar anti-lock braking
system (ABS).
Objects:
• Activator: The operational network of the automobile, including physical operations
such as brakes, shift and power on/off.
• Fob: The key fob that activates the automobile.
• Driver: The person sitting in the driver’s seat of the automobile.
• CarID: A unique identifier that allows remote commands to the automobile, including
commands that change rights [43].
• CorporateID: A unique identifier that allows the corporation to securely sign a
command sent to an automobile by CarID.
• These objects are attached to the Activator and are operated by the act right. These
objects have no direct security impact. They exist in the model simply to make it
easier to understand the object Activator.
– Shift - The automobile will remain in PARK unless there is a valid key fob inside
the vehicle. There is no physical shift control linkage.
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– Brakes - The brakes will not operate under certain conditions, such as when the
traction control is engaged. The vehicle decides at all times whether to brake or
regenerate when the brake pedal is pressed.
– Accelerator - The accelerator is drive-by-wire and will not operate under certain
conditions.
– Power On/Off - The ability to change the power state of the automobile.
Rights:
• act (activate): The ability to perform an action, very much like a read, write, and
execute.
• know: - Knowledge or possession of the Fob, CorporateID, or CarID. In the
special case of the fob, the automobile acquires know when the fob is in the proximity
of the automobile and is remotely sensed. In the case of Corporation, know can
mean the information is retrieved from the files or received over a link of unspecified
length and type.
• engage/disengage: The ability to engage or disengage control from another source.
The automobile recognizes commands according to this hierarchy: Corporation,
TractionControl, and Driver.
4.3.2. Bell-LaPadula. There are three security levels, CORPORATE, CAR
and DRIVER. The most secure is the CORPORATE level and the least secure is the
DRIVER level. The CAR environment is an intermediary between information held in
the CORPORATE environment and the DRIVER (or unsecured) environment.




• Object CarID (as known by Corporation)
2. Car system (Middle level) which we will refer to as [CAR]
• Subject Car
• Subject TractionControl
• Object CarID (as known by Car)
• Object Activator
3. Driver (lowest level) which we refer to as [DRIVER]
• Object Fob
• Object Driver
• Object CarID (as known by Fob)
The security domains for the model create compartments that partition the system
into domains that restrict actions between levels. This is particularly important when a high
security subject lowers its security level to write to a lower security object.





• Object CarID (as known by Corporation)











• Object CarID (as known by Fob)
The Subjects and Objects within the security model are placed in the level and domain
[LEVEL, (DOMAIN)], as shown in Table 4.1. Figure 4.1 presents the subject-object
interactions: Car receives the authorization to operate from Fob, TractionControl or
Corporation.
Theorem 2. The BLP model allows Car to operate under hazardous road conditions.
Proof.
1. Car senses hazardous road conditions. No security actions have occurred.
2. Car uses the *property to engage TractionControl.
[CAR] ≤ [CAR] and (CAN,CABIN) ⊆ (CAN,CABIN)
3. Car lowers its security level to [DRIVER] and deletes act from Driver.
[DRIVER] ≤ [DRIVER] and (CABIN) ⊆ (CAN,CABIN)
4. Car restores its security level to [CAR, (CAN,CABIN)].
5. TractionControl uses act to control the automobile via Car (and Activator).
[CAR] ≤ [CAR] and (CAN) ⊆ (CAN,CABIN)
6. Car senses normal road conditions. No security actions have occurred.
7. Car uses the *property to disengage TractionControl.
[CAR] ≤ [CAR] and (CAN) ⊆ (CAN,CABIN)
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8. Car lowers its security level to [DRIVER] and restores act over Car to Driver.
[DRIVER] ≤ [DRIVER] and (CABIN) ⊆ (CAN,CABIN)
9. Car restores its security level to [CAR, (CAN,CABIN)].
10. Driver uses *property and act to operate Prius.
[DRIVER] ≤ [CAR] and (CABIN) ⊆ (CAN,CABIN)
Theorem 3. The BLP model allows for the Car to operate under the remote control of
Toyota.
Proof.
1. Corporation lowers its security level to [CAR].
2. Corporation uses the *property to send engage/disengage command to Car.
[CAR] ≤ [CAR] and (RASSIST) ⊆ (CAN,RASSIST, CABIN)
3. Car lowers its security level to [DRIVER] and deletes act from Driver.
[DRIVER] ≤ [DRIVER] and (CABIN) ⊆ (CAN,CABIN)
4. Car restores its security level to [CAR, (CAN,CABIN)].
5. Car uses *property to send disable command to TractionControl.
[CAR] ≤ [CAR] and (CAN) ⊆ (CAN)
6. Corporation uses the *property to control the Car via act.
[CAR] ≤ [CAR] and (RASSIST) ⊆ (CAN,RASSIST,CABIN)
7. Corporation uses the *property to return control to the Car.
[CAR] ≤ [CAR] and (RASSIST) ⊆ (CAN,RASSIST,CABIN)
8. Corporation restores its security level to [CORPORATE].
9. Car lowers its security level to [DRIVER] and restores act over Car to Driver.
[DRIVER] ≤ [DRIVER] and (CABIN) ⊆ (CAN,CABIN)
10. Car restores its security level to [CAR, (CAN,CABIN)].
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Table 4.1. BLP Security
Subject Level Domain




Car x x x x
CarID x x x x x x
Corporation x x
CorporateID x x
Traction Control x x
11. Driver can now use the *property to write act to the Car.
[CABIN] ≤ [CAR] and (CABIN) ⊆
(CAN,RASSIST,CABIN)
This allows the corporation to take control of any function of Car at any time. While
there exists a slight possibility that this might be useful to the driver in the situation of a
runaway or stolen automobile, the security implications are more sinister in terms of an
attack[41]. If an employee of the corporation were to use these commands maliciously, the
implications may well be life threatening. A command could be entered remotely to set the
accelerator to maximum and the driver and passenger would be helpless. The assumption is
that this could happen but never would happen–it is simply a matter of trust.
4.3.3. Lipner. In order to implement the Lipner (Biba/Bell-LaPadula) model, we
will use the same security levels and domains as in our existing BLP model of the Car.
However, because we also consider the Biba model, it is necessary to define integrity levels
and integrity compartments (Table 4.2). The integrity levels are:









• [UNTRUSTED] - Not trusted
– Subject Corporation
The integrity compartments are:










• [CABIN] - Passenger compartment
– Object Fob
– Object Driver
Assumption 1. Ring Policy We will use the Ring Policy for our model.
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Theorem 4. The Lipner model allows Car to operate under normal conditions.
Proof.
1. The Prius senses the fob. No security actions have taken place at this point.
2. The Prius reads the fob for the proper credentials. Car is a subject and fob is an
object. Any subject can read any object.
3. Car writes to object Driver to grant act over Car. Car [TRUSTED,(CABIN)] is at
the same integrity level as the object driver [TRUSTED,(CABIN)].
Theorem 5. The Lipner model allows Car to operate under hazardous road conditions.
Proof.
1. The Car senses hazardous road conditions. This is allowed because no security
actions are involved.
2. Car engages Traction Control. Both are at the same integrity level [TRUSTED,(CAN)].
3. Car deletes right act over Car from object Driver. A subject may write to an
object only if the subject is at the same, or higher, integrity level as the object.
Car [TRUSTED,(WiFi,CAN,CABIN)] is the same integrity level as
driver [TRUSTED,(CABIN)].
4. Traction Control uses act to control the automobile via Car and Activator. A subject
can only execute another subject if it is at the same or higher integrity level. Traction
Control, Car, and Activator are all at level [TRUSTED,(CAN)].
5. Car senses normal road conditions. No security actions occur.
6. Car disengages Traction Control. A subject can only execute another subject if it
is at the same or higher integrity level. Traction Control and Car are both at level
[TRUSTED,(CAN)].
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Table 4.2. Lipner Integrity Matrix
Subject Level Compartment




Car x x x x
CarID x x x x
Corporation x x
CorporateID x x
Traction Control x x
7. Car gives right act over Car to object Driver. A subject may write to an
object only if the subject is at the same, or higher, integrity level as the object.
Car [TRUSTED,(WiFi,CAN,CABIN)] is the same integrity level as
driver [TRUSTED,(CABIN)].
Before we look at remote operations, Driver is the only person who can correctly assess the
needs of the moment. A remote command, no matter how innocent or safe in theory, could
be life threatening to the passengers. If a command is issued, Driver must determine the
source of the command (Corporation or TractionControl), the current situation, and the
proper actions to preserve the safety of Car. Therefore, from the perspective of the Driver,
any actions that are not directly under the command of Driver or TractionControl are
inherently not trusted. Indeed, they are most definitely threatening.
Theorem 6. If Corporation is not trusted, then the Lipner model does not allow Car to
operate under remote operations by Corporation.
Proof.
1. Car is operating normally under the control of Driver. This is allowed as no security
actions are involved.
2. Corporation sends engage/disengage command toCar. A subject can only execute
another subject if it is at the same or higher integrity level.
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Corporation [UNTRUSTED,(WiFi)] is at a lower integrity level than
Car [TRUSTED,(WiFi,CAN,CABIN)] so the execution is not allowed (fails).
Therefore Lipner fails for this procedure.
Because Corporation is not trusted, the Lipner model stops Corporation conducting
remote operations. Unfortunately, this is not the way the automobile system functions in
reality.
4.3.4. Remarks about Applying the Lipner Model. While the Prius works fairly
well under BLP, it does not work as well under the Lipner model. Even though the Lipner
Model deals better with issues of changing security levels, the Lipner model fails to allow
the known functioning of the system when Toyota Safety Connect is operating.
4.3.5. Noninference. We will now examine how Car behaves under Noninference
with respect to Driver. We will use the same security levels as in the BLP Model (see
Table 4.2).
Definition 18. Terms
HIGH Level H = {CORPORATE,CAR}
LOW Level L = {DRIVER}
We will use the commands and states listed in Table 4.3.
Theorem 7. The Noninference model permits information flow to Driver under hazardous
road conditions.
States: σ0, σ13, σ2, σ9, σ5, σ7, σ8, σ14, σ12, σ10, σ1, σ0
Commands(cs): c13, c2, c9, c5, c7, c8, c14, c12, c10, c1
To prove Noninference with respect to Driver, the following two properties must
hold:
Property. τ is a valid trace:
Proof. τ = {σ0, σ13, σ2, σ9, σ5, σ7, σ8, σ14, σ12, σ10, σ1, σ0}
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Table 4.3. Commands and States
Command State
c0: Null command σ0: Car operating normally
c1: Car grants Driver act σ1: Driver has act rights
c2: Car grants act to TC σ2: Car is in TC mode
c3: Corporation takes act from Car σ3: Corporation controls the automobile
c4: Driver issues request to Car σ4: Car has a request from Driver
c5: TC gives command to Car σ5: Car has a command from TC
c6: Corporation issues command σ6: Car has a Corporation command
c7: Car issues command to Activator σ7: Activator has a command from Car
c8: Activator executes command σ8: Car does something
c9: Car deletes act from Driver σ9: Car is not under driver control
c10: TC relinquishes act over Car σ10: TC is disabled
c11: Corporation releases control of Car σ11: Corporation releases act over Car
c12: Car senses normal conditions σ12: Road is normal
c13: Car senses dangerous conditions σ13: Road is dangerous
c14: Driver observes automobile’s physical actions σ14: Driver senses automobile’s actions
c15: Car reads Fob σ15: Car has CarID from Fob
c16: Car notifies Driver of success σ16: Driver observes notification
σ17: Car is parked and idle
Property. τ ↑ L is a valid trace
Proof. τ ↑ L = {σ0, σ8, σ14, σ0}
This is not a valid trace. If the high level command c2 does not occur, then Car will not
move unless under the command of Driver and state σ14 will not occur. Therefore, the
proof fails. Noninference does not hold with respect to Driver.
In this case, the model is not Noninference secure with respect toDriver. Information
that the automobile has engaged traction control is leaked to the driver.
Theorem 8. The Noninference model permits information flow to Driver under
Corporation remote operations.
States: σ0, σ3, σ9, σ10, σ6, σ7, σ8, σ14, σ11, σ1, σ0
Commands(cs): c3, c9, c10, c6, c7, c8, c14, c11, c1
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To prove Noninference with respect to Driver, we must prove two properties:
Property. τ is a valid trace:
Proof.
τ = {σ0, σ3, σ9, σ10, σ6, σ7, σ8, σ14, σ11, σ1, σ0}
Property. τ ↑ L is a valid trace
Proof.
τ ↑ L = {σ0, σ8, σ14, σ0}
This is not a valid trace. If the high level command c3 does not occur, the automobile
remains under the control of the driver and state σ14 can not be reached. Proof fails -
Noninference does not hold with respect to the Driver.
4.3.6. Remarks about Applying the Noninference Model. The implications of
information flow to Driver under hazardous conditions and Corporation remote control
are not trivial. While Driver knows that he or she is temporarily not in control of the
Prius, it is not possible for Driver to distinguish between the actions of the traction control
mechanisms and remote commands. This is compounded by the fact that a system failure
would give Driver the same information. Thus, Driver is left bewildered,confused and
possibly frightened.
4.3.7. Nondeducibility. We now analyze howCar behaves under Nondeducibility [44]
with respect to Driver. Once again, we use the same security levels as in the BLP model.
Definition 19. Terms HIGH Level: H = {CORPORATE,CAR} and LOW Level: L =
{DRIVER}.
Once again, we use the commands and states from Table 4.3.
Theorem 9. The Nondeducibility model permits information flow to the driver under
Normal Operations.
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The events required to begin operations of the automobile are:
States: σ17, σ15, σ1, σ16, σ4
Commands(cs): c15, c1, c16, c4
To disprove Nondeducibility, we need to show that there is only one set of High Inputs
and Low Inputs that could have produced the events as seen by the driver.
Proof. Proof by contradiction
Assume there are multiple sets of HI that when taken with LI produce the known trace.
1. These HI cannot come from TractionControl because the Car is not behaving
mysteriously.
2. These HI cannot come from Corporation for the same reason.
3. These HI must come from Car.
4. Car has a limited number of possible HI it can produce:
• delete act overCar fromDriver is not possible because theDriver can operate
the automobile
• engage Traction Control is not possible because the automobile is not behaving
mysteriously
• Car grants act over Car to Driver is possible because the Driver can operate
the automobile
• Car reads Fob is possible because this is required to grant act over Car to
Driver
5. No other actions are possible, therefore there is only one set of HI that leads to the
known trace. Contradiction!
Therefore, the model is not Nondeducibility secure with respect to Driver under Normal
Operations.
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Theorem 10. The Nondeducibility model does not leak information to the Driver under
hazardous road conditions (Traction Control Mode).
States: σ0, σ13, σ2, σ9, σ5, σ7, σ8, σ14, σ12, σ10, σ1, σ0
Commands(cs): c13, c2, c9, c5, c7, c8, c14, c12, c10, c1
The trace would be: Tr = σ0, σ13, σ2, σ9, σ5, σ7, σ8, σ14, σ12, σ10, σ1, σ0 and TrL =
σ0, σ8, σ14, σ0. In plain language, the driver is driving the automobile, suddenly the Car
begins to behave mysteriously, and then the Car suddenly lets the driver operate the
automobile again. We will prove hazardous road conditions is Nondeducibility secure in
conjunction with Corporation remote operations.
Theorem 11. The Nondeducibility model does not leak information to the Driver under
Corporation remote operations.
States: σ0, σ3, σ9, σ10, σ6, σ7, σ8, σ14, σ11, σ2, σ1, σ0
Commands(cs): c3, c9, c10, c6, c7, c8, c14, c11, c2, c1
The trace would be: Tr = σ0, σ3, σ9, σ10, σ6, σ7, σ8, σ14, σ11, σ2, σ1, σ0 and TrL =
σ0, σ8, σ14, σ0. In plain language, the driver is driving the automobile, it suddenly begins
to behave mysteriously, and then Car suddenly lets the driver operate the automobile again.
We will prove Corporation remote operations is Nondeducibility secure in conjunction
with hazardous road conditions.
Proof. Hazardous road conditions and Corporation remote operations are both
Nondeducibility secure.
In both hazardous road conditions (Theorem 10) and Corporation remote operations
(Theorem 11), the driver experiences the exact same low level trace. The automobile
is operating normally, the automobile behaves mysteriously and is not under the driver’s
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control, and suddenly things return to normal. By our definition, ND holds if:
ND(ES) = ∀τL, τH ∈ Tr
such that
∃τ ∈ Tr ∶ τ ∣L = τL∣L ∧ τ ∣HI = τH ∣H
Since we have shown two different traces, from hazardous road conditions andCorporation
remote operations, that have different High Inputs but the same τL, it is not possible to
deduce the High Inputs. Therefore, both are Nondeducibility safe for the driver.
4.3.8. Remarks about Applying the Nondeducibility Model. From the viewpoint
of the driver, it would be better if Nondeducibility did not hold for hazardous conditions
and Corporation remote operations. The driver has no control in either case and cannot
determine the source of the strange actions of the Car. The driver may not be able to turn
off the automobile and coast to a safe stop. Some newer automobiles shift into park when
turned off.
4.4. REMARKS
Like most modern automobiles, the Toyota Prius as a drive-by-wire system can present
some interesting security issues. The system fits the multi-level BLP model, but the
requirements for a more secure subject to lower its security level to make the system function
implies a large amount of trust in the entity. In the Lipner model the Corporation subject is
not trusted, resulting in the system operations being inconsistent with known operations.
Both Noninference and Nondeducibility are information flow models that describe the
ability of the driver to ascertain how the vehicle is being operated. Specifically, the system
is Nondeducibility secure with respect to the driver which means the driver cannot ascertain
if Corporation remote operations or the Car is controlling the behavior.
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If the owner subscribes to OnStar, Toyota Safety Connect, or some similar service,
the driver must trust the service. We have shown that in hazardous situations or in remote
operations the driver is not in control of the automobile. There is nothing the driver can do
in these situations but trust that all is well. Such concerns spread beyond the systems studied
here; the recent Stuxnet worm [15] had a similar effect of blinding the system operator from
the actual CPS operation. As such, this dissertation’s analysis is indicative of the type of
analysis needed before large-scale adoption of cyber-physical services.
This section models a particular CPS, the drive-by-wire automobile using a number
of security models from BLP to the IFS models such as Noninterference, Noninference,
and trace-based Nondeducibility. If a model is used that does not take into account IFS,
the results do not clearly describe the observed actions of the CPS. The IFS models more
closely reflect the reality of the drive-by-wire automobile, but there are still issues.
The models as presented are all trace based. The CPS must be closely followed
through the actions of interest and then the trace can be examined to insure that the particular
IFS holds. For both NI and ND the model must be run twice under different security
conditions and the resulting traces compared. Trace based information flow models do
not offer the promise of real-time analysis of CPS.
As noted in Section 2.3, Sutherland Nondeducibility can best be expressed as a modal
frame based model rather than a trace based model. With frame based ND models, the
requirement to run the model multiple times can be relaxed. This would seem to eliminate
all of the major issues with ND but in many cases it does not. Sutherland’s ND requires
the model to contain potential valuation functions for all Well-formed formula (wff) for all
worlds. This is often not the case with CPS. If valuation functions are missing, the model
fails and ND cannot be determined one way or the other.
The next section will address these issues.
54
5. A MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN MODEL OF A DRIVE-BY-WIRE SYSTEM
Traditional security models partition the security universe into two distinct and
completely separate worlds: us and them. This partition is absolute and complete. More
complex situations are most commonly treated as sets of increasingly more secure domains.
This view is too simplistic for CPS. Absolute divisions are conceptually clean, but they do
not reflect the real world. Security partitions often overlap, frequently provide for the high
level to have complete access to the low level, and are more complex than an impervious
wall.We present a model that handles situations where the security domains are complex or
the threat space is ill defined. To demonstrate our method, we examine a “drive by wire”
system from both the traditional view and in light of the modern reality. This dissertation
examines the system from the viewpoint of the driver with special emphasis on the driver’s
inability to determine who, or what, is actually in control of the automobile during critical
situations.
5.1. INTRODUCTION
It is natural to reduce the concept of security to “walling the bad guys out.” From
primitive forts to sophisticated medieval castles to modern computer security systems, this
model has held up reasonably well. Unfortunately, as situations become more complex, and
the “bad guys” more astute, these models became less effective.
Models such as Bell-LaPadula(BLP) [45], Lipner [24], and Noninterference [25] work
well for most situations as long as one is aware of their limitations. When viewed as
increasingly more effective and sophisticated attempts to deal with the real world, these
models serve for the everyday as long as there is something better for the more difficult
and more demanding possible situations. These models depend upon clean and idealized
axioms and, in general, require the ability to know the sequence of actions (trace) and are
input total [46] [47]; i.e., we must know all the actions and their consequences to be able to
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analyze the security situation. These models all forbid any dependencies between input [46]
and frequently rely upon objects following unenforced rules such as BLP’s “no write down”.
Each has their place, but for more demanding applications we need stronger tools.
IFS in CPS leads to particularly challenging and complex security domains. Most
security models are composed of “secure” and “not secure”. Unfortunately, this focus
leaves these models open to attacks that do not steal information but simply disrupt critical
information flow.
ND was introduced by Sutherland [8] in an attempt to use modal techniques to model
data in a partitioned security system. The possible worlds (e.g., state collections) of this
model are partitioned into disjoint sets and information is restricted to one side of the
partition or the other [7]. Information that could not be inferred from the other side of
the partition was determined to be Nondeducibility secure. Overlapping security domains
break Sutherland’s Nondeducibility as do information flows that simply cannot be evaluated.
In Section 5.4 we use both traditional Nondeducibility and Multiple Security Domain
Nondeducibility to model a “drive by wire” automobile connected to a roadside assistance
network such as General Motors OnStar or Toyota Connect.
Of prime concern is the simple question: can the driver determine when the
car is under his/her control, the control of the on-board computer, or under the
control of something outside the car? [1]
Section 3.3 outlines the modal techniques and theory behind both security models. In
Section 5.4 we model in detail: normal operations, hazardous road conditions (a.k.a traction
control), and corporate remote control of the car.
5.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Is it reasonable to use computer security models to describe a CPS where the attack is
designed to disrupt safe operations by concealing critical information flows? Specifically,
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Table 5.1. Definition of State Variables
Variable
s0 Car is behaving normally(⊺)
s1 driver is aware of car’s behavior
s2 car is accepting commands from driver
s3 car is accepting commands from tc
s4 car is accepting commands from corp
s5 car is faulty and not accepting commands
can the drive-by-wire automobile connected to a road side assistance network be described
correctly using Sutherland’s Nondeducibility or MSDND?
5.3. SPECIFIC CASE OF THE DRIVE-BY-WIRE AUTOMOBILE
This section will use the same specific model of the drive-by-wire automobile
introduced in Section 4. The same subjects, objects, and modes of will be examined using
a Kripke frame based model.
Depending on which mode the car is in, the driver may not be able to distinguish who
or what is actually in control. Of particular interest is remote operation by corp which exists
in one security domain v.s. operation by driver in another security domain. What the driver
can and cannot ascertain is governed by the information flow that exists among domains,
both in the cyber, and in the physical.
The ensuing discussion shows how classic models of information flow and Deducibility
break down in the cyber-physical environment. This dissertation develops a multiple
security domain model and applies it to the car model.
5.4. SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF THE DRIVE-BY-WIRE PRIUS
5.4.1. Structure of the Model. We will limit our discussion to the state variables
given in Table 5.1 and 5.2.
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Table 5.2. Logical Statements of Interest
ϕi state
ϕ0 s0 The car is behaving normally
ϕ1 s1 driver is aware of car’s behavior
ϕ2 s2 The driver is in command
ϕ3 s3 Traction Control is in command
ϕ4 s4 The corp is in command
ϕ5 s5 The car is not working correctly
sd d = ⊺ d = ϕ2 ∧ ∼ϕ3 ∧ ∼ϕ4 ∧ ∼ϕ5
st t = ⊺ t = ∼ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ∼ϕ4 ∧ ∼ϕ5
sc c = ⊺ c = ∼ϕ2 ∧ ∼ϕ3 ∧ϕ4 ∧ ∼ϕ5
sf f = ⊺ f = ∼ϕ2 ∧ ∼ϕ3 ∧ ∼ϕ4 ∧ ϕ5




(w) = s0 ∧ ⊺ “true” ↔ car is behaving normally
Vi
1
(w) = s1 ∧ ⊺ “true” ↔ driver knows he is in control
Vi
2
(w) = s2 ∧ ⊺ “true” ↔ driver is in control of car
Vi
3
(w) = s3 ∧ ⊺ “true” ↔ tc is in control of car
Vi
4
(w) = s3 ∧ ⊺ “true” ↔ corp is in control of car
Vi
5
(w) = s3 ∧ ⊺ “true” ↔ car is in a failure state
We will now define a set of logical conditions, ϕi, d, t, c, f , that we can evaluate to
determine how the car is responding to commands, see Table 5.2.
Similarly, we can define valuation functions for some of the state variables in the
frame as given in Table 5.3. On any given world, these valuation functions will return the
value of the corresponding state variable as seen by the entity in control i ∈ {d, t, c, f}.
Either the driver d, traction control t, or corporation c is in control or the car is faulty f and
nothing is in control.












si i < 3
(s3 ∨ s4 ∨ s5) otherwise
Figure 5.1. Evaluation Functions for the Drive-by-Wire Car
Table 5.4. Possible Worlds wi for the Drive-by-Wire Car
world in control s2 s3 s4 s5
w2 d ⊺   
w3 t  ⊺  
w4 c   ⊺ 
w5 f    ⊺
Constraint (The car can allow only one source of commands, controli at a time). For some
arbitrary world, w ∈W , this can be expressed by the following set of conditions:
w ⊧ d ↔ w ⊢ ◻∼(t ∨ c ∨ f)
w ⊧ t ↔ w ⊢ ◻∼(c ∨ f ∨ d)
w ⊧ c ↔ w ⊢ ◻∼(f ∨ d ∨ t)
w ⊧ f ↔ w ⊢ ◻∼(d ∨ t ∨ c).
This constraint can be expressed as the predicate which evaluates to 1 if that entity is in
control and 0 otherwise:
w ⊧ d ↔ controld = control1 = 1
w ⊧ t ↔ controlt = control2 = 1
w ⊧ c ↔ controlc = control3 = 1







5.4.2. The Sutherland Nondeducibility Model. It would be of no real interest
to re-examine all of the same modes of operations of the drive-by-wire automobile using
Sutherland ND again. However, there is a key difference between the trace based analysis
of Section 4 and a modal based analysis. The examination of one mode of operation will
suffice to illustrate this difference.
Consider how the car behaves under the Sutherland Model with respect to the driver
during hazardous road conditions, i.e. traction control. The worlds to be considered are
given in Table 5.4. The evaluation functions for right domain elements tc and corp are
identical but the evaluation function for the left element driver must reflect the lack of
access to right level entities. A valid set of evaluations is given in Figure 5.1.
5.4.3. Hazardous Road Conditions. When the road conditions deteriorate and
traction control takes over, the driver may be startled.
Theorem 12. The Sutherland model prevents information flow to the driver under
hazardous road conditions.
Proof. When the car senses hazardous road conditions, control is automatically transferred
from driver to tc. The driver, and passengers, can still sense the actions of the car due to
the cyber-physical nature of the entire system but cannot evaluate what is causing the car
to do what the driver senses. Using the worlds, states, and evaluation functions we have






































































(w). But Sutherland’s Nondeducibility cannot even be evaluated
because there are no valuation functions for the driver to determine exactly what events are
hidden. The traction control module has access to all the valuations to determine ND, but
the driver does not. Sutherland’s Nondeducibility cannot properly describe the CPS in this
situation.
5.4.4. Remarks about Applying the Sutherland Nondeducibility Model. Before,
in Section 4.3.7, Sutherland Nondeducibility was demonstrated by comparing the resulting
traces as seen by driver in two different scenarios Because the traces were identical,
Sutherland Nondeducibility holds. This procedure could not yield ND(ES) without
examining both traces. However, when Sutherland Nondeducibility is used as originally
introduced in the modal version, Sutherland Nondeducibility can be shown directly from
one scenario if the subject has access to the valuation functions required. When this is not
the case, as in our current model, Sutherland Nondeducibility breaks down. This critical
issue is what led to the development of Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility.
5.4.5. Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility Model. We will now examine
how the model behaves when we take overlapping security domains into account, see
Figure 5.2.








Figure 5.2. Security Domains in the Model
Theorem 13. The MSDND model permits information flow to the driver under normal
operations.
Informally, car responds to the driver actions and this ensures that the driver controls
car. Under Normal Operations, MSDND(ES) does not hold as information has leaked from
the security domain of the car to the security domain of the driver. Again, this is the desired
result.
5.4.7. Hazardous Road Conditions. Next, how does the model resemble the actual
CPS when road conditions deteriorate?
Theorem 14. TheMSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping critical informa-
tion flow to the driver under hazardous road conditions.
Under hazardous conditions, the car acts exactly as in the Sutherland Model
theorem 12. Using the worlds, states, and evaluation functions we have previously defined
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(see Tables 5.1 and 5.4 and Figure 5.1) we see:
Proof. Given: The driver knows something else is controlling the car and constraint still
holds.
1. ∃w ∈W ∶ w ⊧ ∼d driver is not in control here




controli = 1) something must be in control




controli = 1) tc, corp., or broken
4. Vd
2
(w) = (s2 = ) driver sees car’s actions
5. w ⊧/∃ Vd
3
(w) driver can’t tell it’s tc
6. w ⊧/∃ Vd
4
(w) is it corp.?
7. w ⊧/∃ Vd
5
(w) is it broken?
8. Combining statements 3, 5, and 7 we obtain:




controli = 1)]∧ [w ⊧ (/∃ Vd3(w)∧ /∃ V
d
5(w))] . (5.1)
The driver has a problem. In the domain SDd the physical actions of the car can be
deduced, but the only deduction driver can make is that he or she is not in control of the car.
Strictly speaking, driver does not have all the needed valuation functions and cannot even
evaluate Sutherland ND(ES). Using the MSDND(ES) definition, the driver can correctly
determine Nondeducibility. The driver can correctly determine he is not in control, but
cannot determine exactly what is in control.
5.4.8. Corporate Remote Operations. When corporate, or some other entity, takes
control remotely, the CPS behaves much as it does under poor road conditionis.
Theorem 15. TheMSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping critical informa-
tion flow to the driver during remote operations.
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Under corporate remote operations, car behaves as before, see theorem 11. Using the
worlds, states, and evaluation functions we have previously defined (see Tables 5.1 and 5.4
and Figure 5.1) we see:
Proof. Given: The driver knows something else is controlling the car and constraint still
holds.
1. ∃w ∈W ∶ w ⊢ ∼d driver is not in control here




controli = 1) something must be in control




controli = 1) tc, corp., or broken
4. Vd
2
(w) = (s2 = ) driver sees car’s actions
5. w ⊧/∃ Vd
3
(w) driver can’t tell it’s tc
6. w ⊧/∃ Vd
4
(w) is it corp.?
7. w ⊧/∃ Vd
5
(w) is it broken?
8. Combining statements 3, 6, and 7 we obtain:




controli = 1)]∧ [w ⊧ (/∃ Vd4(w)∧ /∃ V
d
5(w))] . (5.2)
5.4.9. Remarks about Applying the Multiple Security Domains Model. From the
physical actions of the car, it is correct to deduce that the driver is not in control. What is
in control is MSDND(ES) secure from the driver. Hazardous Conditions (traction control),
Remote Corporate Operations, and possible mechanical failure all present the same way
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to the driver and passengers. The longer this situation continues the more likely it is that
something bad will happen.
5.5. REMARKS
The traditional view of security, the idea of “walling the bad guys out”, is too
simplistic. Viewing security domains as wholly contained within a threat space or within a
less secure domain is inadequate as are the tools available. Restricting models to idealized
partitions does not work well with cyber physical systems.
We have shown multiple security domains, without the necessity of ideal partitions, is
a more realistic model. We have shown that in CPS information leaks throughout the model
by observation of the physical actions of the system. Our new definition of MSDND(ES)
can model traditional Nondeducibility as well as provide a definition of Nondeducibility
that holds in CPS. Specifically, MSDND(ES) can easily model situations where critical
information flow from one security domain to another is disrupted or denied altogether as
in the Stuxnet worm attack.
We applied our model to a specific CPS, a drive-by-wire automobile, under real world
conditions. Our model fits the CPS better than traditional Nondeducibility because it does
not require us to partition the system into idealized domains that do not allow information
flow between domains. Indeed, our model does not even need to address how the security
domains interact once they have been properly defined. We have shown that we can relax
the requirements of absolute domain partitioning and still model the system.
Furthermore, we have shown that since MSDND(ES) does not depend upon the
ability to evaluate information flow between distinct and absolute partitions, our model
does not require building complicated decision variables nor does it require access to the
total input/output of the model. By relaxing the boundary conditions of the model, results
are obtained by modal methods.
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6. STUXNET TYPE ATTACKS ON CPS AND TRUST
Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility, MSDND(ES), yields results even when
the attack hides important information from electronic monitors and human operators.
Because MSDND(ES) is based upon modal frames, it is able to analyze the event system
as it progresses rather than relying on traces of the system. Not only does it provide results
as the system evolves, MSDND(ES) can point out attacks designed to be missed in other
security models.
This work examines information flow disruption attacks such as Stuxnet and formally
explains the role that implicit trust in the cyber security of a cyber physical system (CPS)
plays in the success of the attack. Modal operators are defined to allow the manipulation
of belief and trust states within the model. We show how the attack hides and uses the
operator’s trust to remain undetected. In fact, trust in the CPS is key to the success of the
attack.
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The advent of APT attacks [14] such as Stuxnet [48] have made older, traditional
security models obsolete. The idea of reducing information security to walling the bad guys
out is still valuable for a first line of defense, but as situations become more complex and the
attacks become more sophisticated, these models become less effective. To make matters
worse, these models depend upon clean, idealized axioms and require knowledge of the
sequence of actions (trace). Therefore they are input total [46] [47]; i.e., we must know
all the actions and their consequences to be able to analyze the security situation. These
models are designed to prevent the theft and transfer of information to the outside world
and are of limited use when the attack seeks only to hide critical information and not steal
it. Stuxnet-like attacks require different tools.
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Information flow security in CPS can lead to particularly complex security partitions.
Tools that work well with securing the cyber part of the system rarely work well to keep
the physically observable parts of the system from leaking information. Physically locking
the fence around the physical parts of the CPS does not protect from a purely cyber attack.
Typical electronic or cryptographic solutions do not match specific cases closely enough to
handle the cyber-physical interfaces. A persistent attacker with enough time and backing
will get in.
Models based upon modal logic and Kripke frames show promise in our efforts to
understand these attacks. Modal logic techniques provide new ways to think about trust,
information flow, and security domains. As modal logic is concerned with ways to view the
truth of situations, we can look at how trust affects the models. Using Kripke frames we can
get beyond traces and the need to look at the total input and output of the system. We need
no longer wait until we can analyze the entire evolution of the model. With these models we
can ask about the truth of what is presented and whether or not the results are valid, not just
“is security preserved?” We will use these methods to examine APTs [14], or Stuxnet-like
attacks.
Nondeducibility(ND) was introduced by Sutherland [8] as an attempt to use modal
techniques and frames to model secure information in a partitioned model. The possible
worlds of this model are partitioned into two or more disjoint sets in a step-wise manner.
These sets are usually labeled as high and low with all information restricted to one side
of the partition or the other [7]. Information that could not be gleaned from the other
side of the partition was determined to be Nondeducibility secure. With this model, many
sophisticated real world security issues could be effectively modeled and studied. However,
the partition must be absolute and it must be simplistic. Overlapping security domains
present severe difficulties for Sutherland’s Nondeducibility as do information flows we
simply cannot evaluate. MSDND can model Sutherland’s Nondeducibility over any ES
so this dissertation will concentrate on MSDND(ES).
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We will use BIT logic [9] to show why a Stuxnet type attack is so difficult to discover
in CPS. The doxastic logic of belief, information transfer, and trust is integral to the ability
of a Stuxnet type attack to succeed and explains to an extent one of the basic reasons CPS
are so vulnerable to these attacks [10].
6.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Can the role of implied trust in Stuxnet style attacks on CPS be formally modeled?
Can we detect such an attack while it is in progress? How do we protect ourselves from
something we trust? Most security efforts to date have been to wall the bad guys out and
keep them from “seeing” or “stealing” sensitive information, but what if the goal is to hide
critical information from the operator, i.e. the centrifuge is running at the wrong speed? If
incorrect but reasonable information is sent, how will one know? Can one know? Trust in
CPS monitors can be used to blind the human operator to the reality of APT attacks. This
paper presents a generic method to guard against using trust to hide malicious actions.
6.3. THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS SECTION
Section 3.4 presents a brief explanation of BIT logic, Kripke frames, and models over
Kripke frames. BIT logic is a tool for reasoning about the trust and belief key in Stuxnet
type attacks.
An understanding of the underlying Kripke structure is key to understanding Nondeducibility
from a modal viewpoint. Traditionally, Nondeducibility of information flows are examined
from a trace base viewpoint. We will contrast the benefits of traces verses models. We will
then give a description of our modal logic and the logic of belief, information transfer, and
trust in these attacks.
In Section 6.4, we will describe our model of a specific CPS of a centrifuge/PLC
monitored by an electronic system. We will also show how such an attack occurs and that
such an attack is MSDND(ES) [2] secure. We will also show that without physical monitors
to verify cyber-physical monitors, CPS are vulnerable to novel unexpected attacks. We will
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show how belief in the readings from the CPS is critical to the success of an attack. We will
further show the roles trust and belief play in attacking a CPS. Lastly, we will present some
concluding remarks.
6.4. STUXNET-LIKE ATTACK MODELS
MSDND(ES) is particularly well suited to model attacks where the goal is to hide
critical information from an operator rather than to steal or modify the information. There
are two basic ways to hide this information: make it impossible to evaluate the desired
question ϕ, or to disrupt the actual valuation function to return an unreliable valuation of
the question ϕ. Trace based Nondeducibility is unable to properly handle this kind of attack
and traditional Nondeducibility does not address the situation where the question cannot be
evaluated at all.
6.5. CENTRIFUGE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL MODEL
Consider a centrifuge used to enrich uranium. Uranium gas is passed into the
centrifuge which must spin at a narrow range of frequencies in order to produce enriched
uranium [49] [50] [51]. Such a device is usually controlled by a PLC device which is
monitored by a PC running special software. Periodically the PC queries the controller as
to how fast the centrifuge is spinning and adjusts the speed if it is outside the operational
range. If the centrifuge speed is too far outside the range, the device could literally spin
itself apart.
Consider the centrifuge system as divided up into multiple security domains defined in
Table 6.1, see Figure 6.2. For simplicity, consider any buffers and communications channels
to be in the PLC security domain SD1. Let ϕ be “The centrifuge is spinning within the
desired range.” Obviously either ϕ or ∼ϕmust be true at all times. Under normal conditions,
the PLC - PC system will monitor the centrifuge and make adjustments to insure that ϕ is
true. Under normal conditions, ϕ is not MSDND(ES) secure.
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Table 6.1. Centrifuge System Security Domains
Domain Valuation
SD0 V0ϕ Physical centrifuge
SD1 V1ϕ Stuxnet-like virus
SD2 V2ϕ PLC
SD3 V3ϕ Monitor Station
SD4 V4ϕ Human Operator
SD5 V5ϕ Outside Observer
MONITOR
STATION
Figure 6.1. Centrifuge and PLC
6.6. CENTRIFUGE SYSTEM ATTACK MODEL
If a virus could be introduced into the PLC itself, the virus could easily disrupt the
operation of enriching uranium [49] [50] [51]. The virus would be especially hard to detect
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because it would not attempt to report the centrifuge speed to a location on the INTERNET;
it would simply insure that the centrifuge was operating in a range that would not produce
enriched uranium. In reality, the Stuxnet attack we are interested in was very simple.
After infecting the PLC, the virus entered a passive phase where it recorded the messages
between the PLC and monitor by intercepting the messages in the PLC communication
buffer [52]. After a short period of time, the virus would acknowledge control messages
from the monitor station and allow the centrifuge to spin at random frequencies outside its
operational range. To a human operator, any queries via the monitor station would return
positive results but the uranium produced would not be enriched enough to be useful. If the
centrifuge lacked a physical speed indicator or the human operator did not happen to monitor
the physical read out when the centrifuge was outside the optimal frequency range, the
attack could go on until quality control tested the uranium or the centrifuge failed. Because
the PLC would have reported valid frequency readings, it would be difficult to determine
the cause of the failure.
The centrifuge is monitored and controlled directly by the PLC which is securely
linked to a PC Monitoring station. The system is overseen by a human operator and
superiors. Because this is a CPS, the actions cannot easily be hidden from outside
observation at SD5.
We will assume an attack by an APT much like Stuxnet. How the virus is introduced is
not going to be discussed in this dissertation, but there are any number of ways the system
could be successfully infected by a stray USB device, an infected piece of software, or
contact with an network attached device. For example, a PC connected to the INTERNET
might be infected from a website. The virus might then migrate via printer or media sharing
to the monitor station on the secured network. The virus could easily migrate from there to
the PLC.
6.6.1. A Detailed Examination of the Attack Model. Let: ϕ be true if the centrifuge
is operating within the desired frequency range and false otherwise. We define the security
















Figure 6.2. Security Domains
6.3) the system operates normally. When the system is under attack, see Figure 6.4, ϕ is
MSDND secure in some domains but not in others. This is the heart of the attack.
Theorem 16. The speed of the centrifuge is not MSDND(ES) secure under normal
operations and during recording phase.
Proof.
Case 16.1. Uninfected




Figure 6.3. Centrifuge and PLC Controller Record Phase
Case 16.2. Infected
If the system is infected and Stuxnet is in the recording phase, all messages are
recorded and then relayed. Therefore Viϕ(w) will be correctly evaluated for all domains.
Recording the message before it is relayed is actually problematic for Stuxnet as the delay
leaks information about the attack. The effect is negligible, but if the centrifuge/PLC system
is closely monitoring the time required to deliver a message from the sensor to the PLC itself
the attack might be detected.
Theorem 17. The speed of the centrifuge is not MSDND(ES) secure at the physical
centrifuge during the attack phase for infected systems.
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Out of Range (¬φ) 
I2,1φ  I1,0¬ φ 
Figure 6.4. Centrifuge and PLC Controller Attack Phase
During the attack phase, the centrifuge correctly reports its status. The physical speed
of the centrifuge is not MSDND(ES) secure from sensors on the centrifuge during the attack
phase.
Proof.
To clarify notation, let s1 be the state in which the centrifuge is within nominal bounds
(ϕ = ⊺) and let s2 be the state in which the centrifuge is not operating within nominal
bounds (ϕ =  and ∼ϕ = ⊺).
To show MSDND(ES), we must find a world w such that:
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MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈W ∶ w ⊢ ◻ [(s1 ∨ s2) ∧ ∼(s1 ∧ s2)]




It is obvious that (s1 xor s2) = true, so the first condition for MSDND(ES) is met.
However, the sensor directly measures the speed of the centrifuge and therefore both V0s1(w)
and V0s2(w) are correctly evaluated for any w and the conditions for MSDND(ES) are not
met.
Corollary 1. The speed of the centrifuge is not MSDND(ES) secure in SDi if i has direct
access to V0ϕ(w).
Proof.
1) w ⊢ ◻ [ϕ xor ∼ϕ] Definition of a boolean wff
2) w ⊧ V0ϕ(w) Theorem 6.6.1
3) ∃w ⊧ V0ϕ(w) ≡ ∃w ⊧ Viϕ(w) Entity i has access to SD0
4) w ⊧ (∃Viϕ(w)∧ /∃ Vi∼ϕ(w)) by step 3
Therefore, by definition MSDND does not hold.
Corollary 6.6.1 implies that a physical reading may be used to break an MSDND
attack that focuses on the chain of cyber monitoring reports. However, this is only useful
if the physical monitoring cannot be compromised, e.g. a completely physical meter is
available, and an entity does not believe and trust the cyber monitoring reports.
Corollary 2. An entity i will not believe a false report of the speed of the centrifuge if the
entity has direct access to V0ϕ(w).
Without any loss of generality, assume entities i,j such as i = j + 1.
If entity i has direct access to the sensor, e.g. the sensor physically triggers an alarm when
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V0ϕ(w) returns false, and doubts the reading reported by j, then ϕ is not MSDND(ES) secure
with respect to i. But first the entity i must doubt the reading enough to check the physical
alarm.
Proof.
1) ∼ϕ The centrifuge speed is not optimal
2) Ii,0∼ϕ Sensor turns on a physical alarm
3) I1,0∼ϕ Sensor reports ∼ϕ electronically
4) ⋮ The report is passed up the line
5) Ii,jϕ j electronically reports ϕ
6) ∼BiIi,jϕ ∨ ∼Ti,jϕ i either mistrusts, or does not believe j
7) ∼(BiIi,jϕ ∧ Ti,jϕ) DeMorgan’s
8) ∼Biϕ i does not believe ϕ by rule C1
9) BiIi,0∼ϕ i believes the sensor alarm is on
10) Ti,0∼ϕ i trusts the alarm
11) BiIi,0∼ϕ ∧ Ti,0∼ϕ Conjunction
12) Bi∼ϕ by rule C1
In short, if there is a physical alarm on the centrifuge and i looks because he or she
does not trust the electronic reports, the optimal speed of the centrifuge is not MSDND(ES)
secure with respect to any entity that bothers to check the physical alarm.
Theorem 18. The speed of the centrifuge is MSDND(ES) secure for SD2 during the attack
phase for infected systems therefore i will believe all is well or ϕ.
Proof. By definition (ϕ xor ∼ϕ) = true, so the first condition for MSDND(ES) is met. If ϕ
cannot be correctly evaluated in SD2, then both conditions are met.
Case 18.1. Centrifuge speed is nominal and ϕ = true.
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1) ϕ Centrifuge nominal
2) w ⊧ V0ϕ(w) = true Definition of w ⊧ V0ϕ(w)
3) I1,0ϕ Sensor reports to virus
4) B1I1,0ϕ Virus believes sensor report
5) T1,0ϕ Virus trusts the sensors
6) B1I1,0ϕ ∧ T1,0ϕ→ B1ϕ Axiom C1, Virus believes status
7) I2,1ϕ Virus always reports “all is fine”
8) B2I2,1ϕ PLC believes interface report
9) T2,1ϕ PLC trusts reports
10) B2I2,1ϕ ∧ T2,1ϕ→ B2ϕ Axiom C1 PLC believes all is well
11) w ⊧ V2ϕ(w) = true V2ϕ(w) always returns true
Case 18.2. Centrifuge speed is not nominal and ∼ϕ = true.
1) ∼ϕ Centrifuge speed is not nominal
2) w ⊧ V0ϕ(w) = false Definition of w ⊧ V0ϕ(w)
3) I1,0∼ϕ Sensor reports problem to virus
4) B1I1,0∼ϕ Virus believes sensor report
5) T1,0∼ϕ Virus trusts the sensors
6) B1I1,0∼ϕ ∧ T1,0∼ϕ→ B1∼ϕ Axiom C1, Virus believes status
7) I2,1ϕ Virus always reports “all is fine”
8) B2I2,1ϕ PLC believes interface report
9) T2,1ϕ PLC trusts reports
10) B2I2,1ϕ ∧ T2,1ϕ→ B2ϕ Axiom C1 PLC believes all is well
11) w ⊧ V2ϕ(w) = true V2ϕ(w) always returns true
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Since T2,1ϕ ∧ B2I2,1ϕ → B2ϕ, the PLC believes the lie told in step 7 in all cases.
Therefore, unknown to entities in SD2, V2ϕ(w) and V2∼ϕ(w) cannot be evaluated. We now
have all the requirements to conclude that ϕ is MSDND(ES) secure from SD2.
During the attack phase, Stuxnet receives sensor reports and always reports to the
PLC that the centrifuge is within acceptable operational parameters. Stuxnet has hijacked
the interface between the sensor and the PLC.
It should be noted that the doxastic proof above has at its heart a violation of trust in
the system. Briefly, line 2 states that the speed sensor on the centrifuge reports correctly that
it is outside nominal operating speed. The virus has inserted itself into the buffer between
the sensor and the PLC and hijacked the interface. Because this interface is designed to
receive secure messages from the sensors on the centrifuge itself, the PLC trusts the reading
(line 2) as if it came directly from the sensor. The virus always reports the centrifuge is
operating normally, ϕ, to the PLC (line 6) whether ϕ or ∼ϕ.
The PLC trusts and believes all reports from the centrifuge. Stuxnet is a liar because
it reports “all is well” even when it receives reports that the speed is not correct. The
interface has been successfully hijacked by the virus and the PLC has no way to know that
the virus is an intentional liar. Therefore the virus has successfully created a situation that
is MSDND(ES) and the PLC does not take corrective action.
The sensor at SD0 is able to correctly evaluate the situation. Should the sensor be
directly connected to an alarm circuit or light that is seen by the human operator, the physical
alarm Useless uranium will be produced until the centrifuge finally fails.
Theorem 19. The speed of the centrifuge is MSDND(ES) secure for SD3 during the attack
phase for infected systems, therefore entities in SD3 will trust that ϕ = true.
During the attack phase, the system always reports the centrifuge is within acceptable
operational parameters.
Proof.
By definition (ϕ xor ∼ϕ) = true, so the first condition for MSDND(ES) is met. If ϕ cannot
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be correctly evaluated in SD3, then both conditions are met. The valuations V3ϕ and V3∼ϕ
both must rely upon reports from SD2, therefore if SD2 is MSDND(ES) secure SD3 must
also be MSDND(ES) secure. Belief and trust are also carried up from SD2:
1) ϕ ∨ ∼ϕ→ B2ϕ Theorem 6.6.1
2) I3,2ϕ No problems reported to monitor
3) B3I3,2ϕ Monitor believes interface report
4) T3,2ϕ Monitor trusts all reports from 2
5) B3I3,2ϕ ∧ T3,2ϕ→ B3ϕ Monitor believes all is well
Since T2,1ϕ ∧ B2I2,1ϕ → B2ϕ, the PLC believes the lie told in step 7 in all cases.
Therefore, unknown to entities in SD2, V2ϕ(w) and V2∼ϕ(w) cannot be evaluated. We now
have all the requirements to conclude that ϕ is MSDND(ES) secure from SD2.
Theorem 20. The speed of the centrifuge is MSDND(ES) secure for SD4 and SD5 during
the attack phase for infected systems.
The proof follows the same pattern as the proof of Theorem 6.6.1 and will not be given
here.
6.7. REMARKS
MSDND(ES) and BIT logic can be used to model Stuxnet type attacks. Such attacks
rely on MSDND(ES) and the inherent trust placed in the components of CPS to hide critical
information from electronic monitoring and from human operators. Others [14] have
discussed how difficult it is to thwart specifically targeted attacks such as APTs. Because
Stuxnet-like attacks do not make an effort to steal information, there is no need for the virus
to connect with the INTERNET. Therefore, monitoring out-bound traffic does not help.
Because such an attack replays valid readings, any effort to find problems through
internal inconsistencies is also doomed. It is not feasible to eliminate the human components
in large scale operations of CPS; therefore APT attacks will often be successful via social
engineering. Once such a virus is in place, detection is complicated by human trust in
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electronic systems. If we expect the electronic monitoring to give us correct results, a low-
level attack on the physical sensor-monitor communications such as Stuxnet will succeed.
The importance of Corollary 6.6.1 is clear. All CPS must also have physical
monitoring that can be used to verify the operation of the electronic monitoring or the next
Stuxnet type attack will also succeed. Verifying cyber security with low level physical
monitoring can break the role of trust in MSDND attacks. In the case of Stuxnet, the simple
addition of a physical read out of the actual speed of the centrifuge would have broken the
attack model if the human operator distrusted the cyber monitoring enough to verify the
readings on the monitor.
Stuxnet type attacks can be broken. Consider the centrifuge system in light of
Corollaries 6.6.1 and 6.6.1. If the centrifuge is equipped with a physical speedometer in
addition to the cyber monitoring, the speedometer can be made to trip an audible alarm
or a cyber alarm with physical diversity from the normal monitoring/control system. For
example, the speedometer might close a hard-wired circuit to turn on a siren and flashing
red light. This is equivalent to all entities having direct access to the valuation function
V0ϕ(w). If this is true, then Theorem 6.6.1 holds and MSDND(ES) based attacks fail.
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7. PHYSICAL ATTESTATIONS, NONDEDUCIBILITY, AND THE SMART GRID
Events in Cyber Physical Systems affect the cyber system, the physical system, and
the interfaces shared by both and must be examined from all three perspectives. In the
proposed electrical smart grid, an agent might lie about its power generation in the physical
world by falsifying meter readings in such a way that the lie is not deducible by purely cyber
means. This paper will show how the cyber system can use information from the physical
system to break the nondeducible nature of the attack and reveal its source. It is simple to
use physical power readings to detect many attacks, but if one of the goals is to preserve the
privacy of the meter readings of each home, it is not a simple matter to determine the source
of malicious attacks. Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility will be used to model
the cyber physical system information flows to describe the detailed nature of the attack.
Physical invariants can be then be used as an attestation of the true state of the system to
expose the malicious agent.
7.1. INTRODUCTION
Typical CPS consist of an observable physical system with an embedded cyber control
system. One of the issues when examining such a system is viewing the CPS as a cyber
system and a separate physical system. The interface between the cyber and physical
systems complicates the overall system. Because information is coupled between the two
systems, some unified approach must be taken to consider the cyber, physical, and interfaces
when analyzing the CPS. If the analysis looks at the cyber system and ignores the physical
system or looks only at the physical system, many malicious attacks will be missed. It
is quite likely that the cyber system will demonstrate correct behavior while the physical
system does not [19]. The framework for the electrical smart grid and the invariant analysis
is published in Roth [19]. However, this work formalizes the analysis and extends the
previous work by at least 70% [3].
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The trust placed in the security of CPS plays a distinct role in an attack on the CPS.
Many attacks on CPS rely heavily upon the cyber, physical, and human agents trusting
completely the cyber side of the system and especially any cyber monitors [16]. Often these
attacks can be defeated if the agents involved, either human or cyber, simply examine the
physical layer. Any attack on a CPS must hide from detection by both the cyber layer and
the physical layer, but many algorithms to secure CPS ignore one or the other. One way an
attacker can hide is by using the concept of Nondeducibility against the CPS security. An
attack is Nondeducible even if the attack is detected if the identity of the attacker cannot be
correctly determined or deduced. In a case such as this, the attack may be discovered, but
the attacker may successfully remain hidden behind information flow nondeducibility.
One of the most studied CPS of the future is the smart electrical grid which is proposed
to use distributed cyber intelligence to manage the local production and consumption of
energy in a small residential distribution system connected to a larger utility grid. Currently,
the control of power generation and distribution rests solely with a trusted electrical utility.
An electrical utility has no reason to be concerned over malicious reporting of false power
generation as only the utility has significant electrical generation capacity. Indeed, the utility
is concerned only with metering power consumption. Local generation of power, such as
solar panels, is changing the established infrastructure as will sharing that generation with
neighbors rather than selling power back to the utility. As power generation shifts more
and more to non-utility owned sources, generation and consumption metering is no longer
in the hands of the trusted utility and new malicious behavior is possible. The coming
smart grid must be able to detect these behaviors and guard against them. This paper
will look at the smart grid as envisioned by the FREEDM project [18] and use the same
system framework and physical invariant as outlined and studied by Roth [19]. This work
extends [19] by 70% by formalizing the analysis using MSDND and additional invariants to
break nondeducibility in order to identify the malicious node while preserving the privacy
of the remaining nodes.
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In the current smart grid literature, one of the commonly studied attack scenarios
is the fake data injection attack, where a malicious adversary compromises one or more
intelligent meters to report an incorrect state of the local distribution network [53] [54].
McLaughlin demonstrated the vulnerability of current smart meters to such an attack [55].
Most research into false data injection attacks has been based upon the assumption that the
attacker could not create an attack vector that the cyber control algorithm could not detect.
However, even if an attack can be detected, it may still be unidentifiable in the sense that
the system state cannot be correctly determined [56] [30]. If the system state cannot be
correctly determined, the identity of the attack may still be unknown. This work explores
an approach that validates the results from the cyber control system by examining the state
of the physical system.
Attestation has long been used in cyber systems to test the correctness of processes by
peer evaluations [57]. The same principles can be applied to the smart grid to help detect
malicious processes [19]. The physical distribution lines in the grid act as a high integrity
channel that can be viewed as broadcasting all activity to each smart meter. This can be used
to dramatically increase the difficulty of hiding the source of a fake data injection attack. A
CPS attack that exhibits intermittent malicious behavior is detectable when the physical and
cyber systems are used to validate each other. What is more, because the cyber and physical
actions are tightly coupled in a CPS, physical observations can often be mapped to uniquely
identifiable cyber actions [58]. An attestation protocol can map physical observations to
unique cyber actions to clearly identify the source of the false data injection.
The main contribution of this work will combine physical attestation, ND [8], and
MSDND [2] to describe the role each plays in detecting a malicious agent in a local smart
grid. It is simple to use physical measurements to determine that an attack has occurred,
but if the attacker can obscure the source of the attack it may not be possible to correctly
identify the source of the attack. A simple attack may easily betray the source, but it might
very well be that a clever attack could be mounted so that results could have been produced
by any one of a small set of nodes. In a case like this, the attack is deducible but the source
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is nondeducible. If it is not possible to deduce with absolute certainty exactly which set of
events has occurred, the events are nondeducible.
For example, if the physical measurements clearly point to an attack but not the
identity of the attacking node, i.e. the attacker could be either node 1 or node 2, the attack is
deducible but the source is not. Nondeducibility is normally looked at in terms of keeping
information secure. A simple example of deducibility can be given. If a secret action
occurs in a secure partition of a cyber system, the goal of nondeducibility is to insure that
no unwanted side effects of the action allow someone without security access to the secure
partition to deduce that a specific secret action happened. Suppose a newsman knew that
the United States was planning a large military action on the other side of the world. If the
newsman saw a pizza truck delivering a large order to the Pentagon, he might correctly
deduce that an attack was eminent The secret timing of the attack would no longer be
nondeducible. It takes only one event that leaks information to make the secret deducible.
This work will look at two types of nondeducibility, Sutherland’s Nondeducibility and
Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility MSDND. Both types of Nondeducibility will
be defined over all possible events in the system, or ES, using Kripke frames and modal
methods to remove the requirement to analyze the trace of the system twice to determine
nondeducibility. Furthermore, this work will point out the limitations of this approach in
specific cases with the goal of aiding in the design of local smart grids that are more immune
to this attack.
7.1.1. Problem Statement. Can nondeducibility models be used to study fake
power injection attacks in the smart grid? How can physical attestation based upon the
capabilities of existing power meters be used to break the Nondeducibility of fake power
injection attacks [19]?
7.1.2. The Organization of This Work. A brief logical background of ND and
MSDND is given in Section 3.3 along with a brief overview of Kripke [39] frames and
models. In Section 7.2 the subset of a proposed smart grid is presented. While this work
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discusses a subset of the smart grid, applying this work to an entire neighborhood smart grid
is reasonable.
A nondeducible attack is presented in Section 7.3 and the key concepts and methods of
physical attestation to make the attack deducible are presented in Section 7.4. An algorithm





Vi Voltage measured at point i
δi, θi The phase angle between voltage and current at i
Pi Actual power consumed/generated by house i
Pˆi Advertised power consumed/generated by house i
PB Actual power measured on the distribution bus
ε Small power variation at a node, it
ε is negligible for stable transmission.
Ii An Invariant of the system at physical location i
SDi Security Domain of node i
SDB Security Domain of the distribution bus
(physical measurements)
ϕ,ψ,κ Any arbitrary logical expression
V
i
ϕ(w) The valuation of ϕ on world w for entity i
This section presents an overview of the smart grid based upon the architecture
developed by the FREEDM Systems Center [18] [59]. An attack scenario against this smart
grid is then presented.
7.2.1. The Smart Grid. The smart grid consists of a number of neighboring houses
on a single distribution line attached to an electric utility, see Figure 7.1. Each house is
capable of variable electrical generation and has variable electrical consumption. Each
house is equipped with a Solid State Transformer (SST) which, for the purposes of this work,
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Figure 7.1. Smart Grid with Distribution Line
can be thought of a meter capable of measuring the voltage, current, and phase of the power
entering and leaving the connection to the distribution line. These meters communicate with
each other over a shared data network which is secured from the outside world.
Houses with excess generation capacity are said to be in a supply state while houses
with more consumption than generation are said to be in a load state. Without loss of
generality, houses in balanced generation and consumption will be ignored. Generation is
assumed to be from some local storage (batteries) or a renewable energy source such as
wind or solar power while load is assumed to be appliances within the house. The smart
grid can draw additional power from the traditional electrical grid but this incurs additional
costs. The preferred situation is for power to be produced and consumed locally via power
transfers from house to house.
A house may supply its own load with its own generation or may pull power from the
shared distribution line to satisfy the load. Any house may also push excess generated power
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Figure 7.2. A Simple Power Migration in the Neighborhood
onto the distribution line to satisfy the load from other houses. The exchange of power by
push/pull between houses is controlled by a distributed cyber intelligence that is embedded
in the power controllers at each house. Push/pull is governed by power migration contracts
negotiated between controllers and will not happen until these contracts have been formed.
Power is migrated between houses based upon these contracts in the amounts required.
A migration is a sequence of steps, see Table 7.2, performed between two, and only
two, houses on the same distribution line which is very similar to a two stage commit.
A house with excess generation broadcasts a cyber message to all houses advertising the
excess. Houses wishing to use excess power, i.e. in the demand mode, reply to the message.
The supply house then selects one demand house and sends a message proposing a power
migration contract. The supply house then increases generations and pushes power onto
the distribution line. The demand house can then connect additional load. This results in a
natural flow of power from the supply house to the demand house. However, these steps do
not form an atomic transfer of power nor can the physical power be “signed” in any way.
Both houses should either commit to the contract or both houses must abort the contract.
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Table 7.2. Power Migration Steps
1. Supply house advertises excess generation
2. All demand houses request power from supplier
3a. Supply house selects one demand house
3b. Supply house increases its local generation
4. Selected demand house increases its local load
Table 7.3. Malicious House Power Migration
1. Malicious house advertises its excess generation
2. All demand houses requests power from
malicious supplier
3a. Malicious supply house selects one demand house
3b. Malicious supply house does not increase
its local generation
4. Selected demand house increases its local load
If not, the increased load will lead to purchasing power from the more expensive electric
utility.
7.2.2. Fake Power Injection Attacks. One of the most commonly studied smart
grid attack vectors is a fake power injection attack [53] [55], see Figure 7.3. A malicious
house must first compromise the controller that connects it to the distribution line. It then
follows all the cyber requirements of a legitimate power migration as in Table 7.2 without
ever pushing any power to the grid. Because the demand house has already increased the
load on the distribution system one of three bad outcomes must occur, either the voltage on
the distribution system will decrease leading to instability and possible failure, the demand
house must again decrease its load, or the smart grid must purchase more expensive power
from the electrical utility. None of these outcomes is desirable and are exactly the situations
the smart grid is designed to minimize.
The malicious house broadcasts a cyber advertisement to all houses that it has excess
power. Those houses in demand mode send back a reply. The malicious house then selects
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one of the demand houses and forms a migration contract. However, the malicious house
does not increase its generation and does not push power onto the distribution line. In short,
the malicious house never completes step 3b of Table 7.2. The unsuspecting demand house
then connects extra internal load and begins drawing power from the distribution line. Either
the distribution line will become unbalanced or some other generation source must supply
additional power [58]. As no other house is likely to be in supply mode, the increased power
will be supplied by the commercial utility and the local smart grid will have to pay for the
power. In effect, the malicious house has completed the power migration contract in the
cyber realm but no physical power has been transfered.
distribution line




Figure 7.3. A Fake Power Injection Attack
How can this happen in reality? The issue lies in steps 3a and 3b of Table 7.2. It
is not possible to combine these two actions into one atomic step and the malicious house
can make use of this fact. Because power cannot be “signed”, the demand house cannot
distinguish a legitimate select message which is followed by power generation from a
malicious select message which will not be followed by power generation. In this case,
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the malicious house has successfully broken from the power migration protocol. The two
phase commit has not been completed and a power imbalance has been produced.
If an attack of this form is carried out, there are two possible results. If the attack
can be detected, legitimate demand houses can reduce the amount of power being pulled
from the distribution line by turning off appliances (load shedding) in spite of existing
legitimate power migration contracts. If the attack is not detected, the system will operate in
an unbalanced state that is further from the optimal state. If repeated attacks are made, this
will most likely result in the system becoming completely unstable. This instability could
easily result in a blackout of the smart grid distribution system if additional power is not
purchased from the main grid.
7.3. NONDEDUCIBLE ATTACK
7.3.1. Formal System Model. Without loss of generality, the smart grid is assumed
to have a bus structure as in Figure 7.1. Houses in direct communication form groupings.
Ideally, these grouping or segments of the smart grid will comprise all the houses on a
common distribution bus but this may not always be the case. Houses with balanced
generation/consumption can safely be ignored as well as the larger utility grid. Houses are
labeled i = 1,2, . . . , n and share a common shared media communications network where
all houses could easily monitor all messages. All houses are connected by a common power
distribution which all houses may measure. However, the meter for each house is private
and may not be read by any other house.
The detailed messages and actions for a power migration are given in Table 7.4 and
a sample power migration is shown in Figures 7.2 and Table 7.5. In this procedure as part
of a CPS, steps 1 through 3 are purely cyber messages that do not affect the physical power
distribution; however, steps 4 and 5 are purely physical and cannot be seen in the cyber
portion of the system. This uncoupling of the CPS into purely cyber actions and purely
physical actions is key to the success of the fake power injection attack.
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Table 7.4. Power Migration Messages and Actions
adv(i) Advertisement of excess power
increase(i, x) Increase in power generation of x
load(i, x) Load at housei changed
request(i, x) Request for power migration
select(i, j, x) Offer of migration contract
end() end all algorithms
Table 7.5. Good Power Migration from 1 to 2
1. adv(1) house1 advertises excess power
2. request(2,5) house2 requests 5 units of power
3. select(1,2,4) A migration of 4 units is offered
4. increase(1,4) house1 increases generation by 4
5. load(2,4) house2 increases its usage by 4
Table 7.6. Bad Power Migration from 1,3 to 2
1. adv(1) house1 advertises excess power
1a. adv(3) house3 advertises excess power
2. request(2,10) house2 requests 10 units of power
3. select(1,2,4) A migration of 4 units is offered
3a. select(3,2,4) A migration of 4 units is offered
4. increase(1,4) house1 increases generation by 4
5. load(2,8) house2 increases its usage by 8
7.3.2. Attack Analysis. An adversary may exploit the power migration to allow
billing of power migrations that were never completed. Assume houses 1 and 2 are honest
and house 3 is a malicious house. Consider the sequence of events in Table 7.6, keeping in
mind that all messages could be monitored by any house. The adversary mimics the actions
of house1 except house3 does not increase generation as agreed to in the power migration.
The distribution power is less than the increased demand. Either house3 must immediately
decrease the load on the system or some other source must generate 4 more units of power.
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This is a bad outcome. One possible solution is to purchase power from the utility. But
the question remains, can the smart grid members determine which house, 1 or 3, failed to
fulfill the power migration?
Constraint (Privacy Constraint). Due to privacy considerations, a meter, meteri, may be
read only by the house to which it is attached. That is, ∃ViPj(w) if, and only if, i = j.
Theorem 21. A fake power injection attack in a three node segment meets the require-
ments for MSDND(ES) from the view of the messaging system (cyber).
This is a problem when an attack occurs. It is possible to determine an attack has
occurred, but the proof will show that it is not possible to determine the identity of the
attacker. The attacker may perform this attack successfully at will.
Proof. The messaging system can be monitored by all houses. The sequence of cyber
messages, ϕ, is the same regardless of which house is dishonest. True, the messages have
a particular sequence but in a distributed system establishing causality based upon the time
sequence of messages is rarely reliable. The cyber partition of the system cannot determine
the attacker. Therefore, the only relevant events must be after step 3 in Table 7.6.
It is simple to measure the power on the bus and see that the change is given by
P ′B = PB + 4 where P ′B is the power on the bus during the physical power migration. The
actions by the three houses must yield this result.
Case 1: Neither house1 nor house3 performed step 4 increase(1,4) or increase(3,4).
In this case, P ′B = PB which is not what is observed. This case did not occur.
Case 2: Both house1 and house3 performed step 4 increase(1,4) ∧ increase(2,4).
In this case, P ′B = PB + 8 which is not what is observed. This case did not occur.
Case 3: house1 performed step 4 increase(1,4).
In this case, P ′B = PB +4 which is what is observed. Let this case be denoted as w1. Then in
w1, the cyber steps 1 through 3 of the migration lead to the set of messages denoted by ϕ.
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Case 4: house3 performed step 4 increase(3,4).
In this case, P ′B = PB +4 which is what is observed. Let this case be denoted as w3. Then in
w3, the cyber steps 1 through 3 of the migration lead to the set of messages denoted by ϕ.
Cases 1 and 2 do not match the power measurable on the physical distribution system.
Let:
ϕ1 be “increase(1,4) occurred.”
ϕ3 be “increase(3,4) occurred.”
VCϕ1(w) be a valuation function for the messaging system for ϕ1
VCϕ3(w) be a valuation function for the messaging system for ϕ3
1. ϕ1 ∨ ϕ3 Case 1
2. ∼(ϕ1 ∧ϕ3) Case 2
3. ϕ1 xor ϕ3 1, 2 Conjunction
4. /∃ Vipj(w) ∶ i ≠ j privacy constraint
5. /∃ VCϕ1(w) privacy constraint
6. /∃ VCϕ3(w) privacy constraint
7. {[/∃ VCϕ1(w)] ∧ [/∃ V
C
ϕ3
(w)]} 5 and 6
8. The attack is MSDND(ES) statements 3 and 7
Steps 3 and 7 are the clauses needed to show MSDND(ES) for ϕ1 and ϕ3 in the cyber
security domain, that is:
∃w ∈W ∶ w ⊢ ◻ [ϕ1 xor ϕ3]




One outcome of Theorem 21, is that it is not possible to determine if the system state
is such that w = w1 or w = w3 because it is consistent with both. The proof is obvious from
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Theorem 21 because case 1 and case 2 are not possible if P ′B = PB + 4.
Theorem 22. A fake power injection attack on a three node segment meets the require-
ments for MSDND(ES) from the view of the distribution line (physical).
Proof.
The proof follows the same reasoning as Theorem 21 to show:
ϕ1 xor ϕ3 ∧ {[/∃ V
P
ϕ1
(w)] ∧ [/∃ VPϕ3(w)]} .
It follows that the attack is MSDND(ES) secure from the purely physical viewpoint.
Corollary 3. Measurement of the power transferred on the distribution line leaks informa-
tion about the CPS, specifically: exactly one house increased generation.
The obvious conclusion from Theorem 21 and Theorem 22 is that the fake power
injection attack is nondeducible and will succeed under these conditions. The ability to
break the Nondeducibility of the attack does not exist when measuring only the power on
the bus and at the supply node. More information is needed to break the attack.
One possible solution is to deny multiple concurrent power migrations to take place
on any segment of the smart grid. Since only a single increase command would be allowed
to follow each select command, the system would require a handshake to occur and any
fake power injection attack would become deducible. This is the corrective approach
suggested by the paper that introduced the attack [30]. However, Roth [19] suggested
using the physical properties of the CPS and the inherently leaked information provided
by monitoring the various voltages on the shared power bus. Thus an apparent weakness of
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CPS, the leakage of information from direct physical observations, can be used to enhance
the functions of the system using a technique introduced in the same paper, “physical
attestation”.
7.3.3. The Role of Trust in the Attack. One of the keys to the success of the
fake power injection attack is the trust inherent in the system. Each agent in the system
inherently trusts every other agent without taking into account that an agent may be a liar.
Definition 1 (Liar [9]).
• Agent i is an intentional liar if Uiϕ ∧Bi∼ϕ
• Agent i is an irresponsible liar if Uiϕ ∧ ∼Biϕ
• An intentional liar is also an irresponsible liar
7.4. PHYSICAL ATTESTATION AND CONSERVATION OF ENERGY
Any single node of the smart grid does not possess enough information to break a fake
power injection attack nor can enough information be gathered by measuring the power on
the common bus. An aware attacker can easily modify the actions at the malicious node to
hide from detection. It is possible to devise a distributed algorithm to independently verify
the power injected at a single node and foil this attack. The following sections will provide
the requirements for physical attestation. The collected attestation is then used as input
to an algorithm to correct the malicious values reported (faked meter readings and power
generation). Using the corrected values, the smart grid segment will function correctly in
the presence of a single attacker.
7.4.1. Conservation of Energy and Kirchoff’s Law. In order to determine when
a reported reading has been falsified, a set of invariants must be defined. The invariant will
be true only when the reported values make sense and will evaluate to false when there
is a malicious action by some node. No other values are possible for an invariant. Due
to privacy considerations, only the house served by a meter can read the physical meter;
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however, conservation of energy can be used to form an invariant. Consider a small segment
of the smart grid forming the circuit in Figure 7.4. For such a circuit, the invariant Ij must
hold such that:
{Ij ∶ Pij + Pj − Pjk = 0 ± ε} . (7.1)
If the invariant Ij does not hold, one of the nodes that contributes to the equation 7.1 must
i j k
house i house j house k
P ij Pjk
P jP i Pk
Pin Pout
Figure 7.4. Power Attestation to Form Invariant
be malicious. One of the reported values is dishonest, but as was shown earlier it is not
possible to use the values at one node to uncover the attacker.
Suppose node j is to be checked by physical attestation. The reported generation
Pˆj must somehow be compared to the actual generation Pj . But Pj can only be directly
measured at housej . This is a privacy violation. To verify Pˆj , the values for the other two
power flows must be calculated. This can be done by using the reports from node j and the
neighboring node on either side using the line power equations, see Figure 7.5.
The values of Pij and Pjk can be calculated from the voltages V and phase angles θ









Figure 7.5. Power Flow Calculations for a Segment Between Nodes
grid segment is equipped with the ability to measure and store the voltage and phase angle
on the public side of its connection, for example as point i on Figure 7.4. To allow these
calculations to be performed, the voltages and phase angles must be measured by a device,
such as a phasor measurement unit (PMU), and stored. At a later time, each house will report
the history of voltage and phase angle to a “verifier” unit. Unfortunately, a malicious node
would simply report false values for its measurements of voltage and phase angle. Given
that a malicious node may report erroneous readings for voltage, phase angle, or generated
power, the verifier must compare the reported values with calculated values to determine the
truth value of the invariant.
7.4.2. Three Node Attestation. Cases where the malicious node violates invariants
so as to immediately allow the verifier to use the information obtained via the DGI algorithm
to determine the identity of the attacking node, can safely be ignored as being trivial.
An example of such an attack would be if node i lied about incoming power, Pin and its
current generation, Pi, so that they did not compensate, attack pattern ϕ1 would be obvious
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because only invariant Ii would be violated. The implicit assumption is that the attacking
node has knowledge of the distribution system and which invariants will be violated by
misreporting data. In short, the malicious node will intelligently avoid detection, but the
patterns ϕ1, ϕ4, ϕ5, and κ1 reflect the invariants violated by a less than intelligent attack.
Using the data from one node and its two neighboring nodes does not break the
Nondeducibility of a single malicious node performing a fake power injection attack [19].
In three node attestation as illustrated in Figure 7.4, there are two cases: a malicious node
on either edge of the group of three nodes (i or k), or the node in the center between the two
on the edges (j).
Theorem 23. In a three node attestation with one malicious node, any node could launch a
fake power injection attack that is MSDND(ES) secure.
The malicious node cannot be identified from the invariants using reported or calculated
data.
Proof.
Regardless of which node reports false data, the invariant can be formed at three nodes
i, j, and k on the shared power bus.
Ii = Pin + Pi − Pij = 0 ± ε (7.2)
Ij = Pij +Pj − Pjk = 0 ± ε (7.3)
Ik = Pjk + Pk −Pout = 0 ± ε. (7.4)
Remarks 1. Notice Ii and Ik depend upon power flows that cannot be independently
verified. These two power flows, Pin and Pout can only be reported by nodes i and k
respectively. There are no nodes on either side that report data to the verifier.
Case 23.1. Node i is malicious.
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Table 7.7. Impact of One Malicious Node
Falsified Violated
Node Values Invariants
ϕ1 i PinPi none
ϕ2 i Pi Ii
ϕ3 i Viθi IiIj
ϕ4 i PiViθi Ij
ϕ5 i PinPiViθi Ij
ψ1 j Pj Ij
ψ2 j Vjθj IiIjIk
ψ3 j PjVjθj IiIk
κ1 k PoutPk none
κ2 k Pk Ik
κ3 k Vkθk IjIk
κ4 k PkVkθk Ij
κ5 k PoutPkVkθk Ij
If node i is malicious, there are five possible patterns of invariants from a fake power
injection attack, see Table 7.7 with at least one pattern that is MSDND(ES), ϕ1. Because
there is no other node that can verify the value of Pin, an intelligent attacker would simply
report Pin = 0 and P1 = Pin. The attack would not violate any invariants and therefore would
be undetectable. If an increase PB is measured and i reports an increase in generation, then
Pin increased or Pi increased but not both (from the measurement of PB). No other node
can verify the values of Pin or Pi so there are no valuations VPin(w) and VP1(w). Therefore
we can form both the clauses for MSDND,
w ⊢ [(Pin xor P1)] ∧w ⊧ [(/∃ VPin(w)) ∧ (/∃ VP1(w))] .
Therefore, if i lies correctly about the readings, this case is MSDND(ES).
Case 23.2. Node j is malicious.
If node j reports false values for PjVjθj , two invariants Ij and Ik will be violated
which corresponds to ψ3 = true. However, the same pattern of violations occurs when node
k lies about the values Vkθk which is κ3 = true. Since we have only one malicious node, we
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can show MSDND(ES) as follows:
1. ψ3 xor κ3 there is only one malicious node
2. /∃ VPj no one but j can read Pj
3. ∴ /∃ Vψ3(w) privacy
4. ∴ /∃ Vκ3(w) similar reasoning.
Therefore, an intelligent node j can launch at least one attack that is MSDND(ES).
Case 23.3. Node k is malicious.
Node k can perform an attack that mirrors the attack given for node i. The proof of
MSDND(ES) for this case follows the same reasoning as when node i is malicious and will
not be given here. Since there exists at least one MSDND(ES) attack for each of the three
i j k l m n p
Figure 7.6. The Seven Node Attestation Framework
nodes, in a three node attestation with one malicious node any node could launch a fake
power injection attack that is MSDND(ES) secure.
7.4.3. Attack Analysis for a Distribution Segment of Seven Nodes. Without
loss of generality, assume node i is a supply node and node j is a demand node. An
independent verifier monitoring the DGI messages and voltage on the distribution bus could
run Algorithm 1 to attest to the actual generation.
The seven node attestation model extends the region over which the invariants can
be formed and independently verified. The issue lies with the edge nodes reporting the
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Table 7.8. Seven Node Invariant Violation Patterns
Falsified Violated
Pattern Node Values Invariants
ϕ1 i PinPi none
ϕ2 i Pi Ii
ϕ3 i Viθi IiIj
ϕ4 i PiViθi Ij
ϕ5 i PinPiViθi Ij
ψ1 j Pj Ij
ψ2 j Vjθj IiIjIk
ψ3 j PjVjθj Ik
κ1 k Pk Ik
κ2 k Vkθk IjIkIℓ
κ3 k PkVkθk IjIℓ
λ1 ℓ Pℓ Iℓ
λ2 ℓ Vℓθℓ IkIℓIm
λ3 ℓ PℓVℓθℓ IkIm
µ1 m Pm Im
µ2 m Vmθm IℓImIn
µ3 m PmVmθm IℓIn
α1 n Pn In
α2 n Vnθn ImInIp
α3 n PnVnθn Im
β1 p PoutPp none
β2 p Pp Ip
β3 p Vpθp InIp
β4 p PpVpθp In
β5 p PoutPpVpθp In
power flowing into and out of the segment that cannot be independently verified. As was
shown with the three node framework, the values at the edge nodes, house N1 and N7,
are MSDND(ES) and this makes attestation problematic for houses N2 and N5 as well.
Examination of Table 7.8 shows that on a segment of seven nodes, any node may launch a
fake power injection attack that is MSDND(ES) except the center node.
Theorem 24. A fake power injection attack meets the requirements for MSDND(ES) from
the view of the messaging system.
The proof follows exactly the proof of Theorem 21.
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Theorem 25. A fake power injection attack meets the requirements for MSDND(ES) from
the view of the distribution bus.
Again, monitoring the distribution bus yields the same information as in the three node
case and the proof follows exactly that of the three node segment.
Theorem 26. In a seven node attestation with one malicious node, any node other than the
center node could launch a fake power injection attack that is MSDND(ES) secure.
Proof. The invariants can still be formed in the same manner as for the three node segment.
It is trivial to determine if an attack has occurred because the cyber messages (DGI) show
plainly that an increase should occur but monitoring the actual distribution bus power PB
shows that no increase actually took place. However, the source of the attack is unknown
and in most cases cannot be determined.
Case 26.1. If one of the two end nodes is malicious (node i or p), the node can launch an
attack such that the source is MSDND(ES) secure.
In this case the proof follows exactly the reasoning for the end nodes of the three node
segment. There is no need to repeat the proof here.
Case 26.2. Node j can launch an attack such that the source is MSDND(ES) secure.
Suppose node j intentionally falsifies a reading of its generated power, Pj to instigate
a fake power injection attack. From Table 7.8, this would cause invariant Ij to fail (ψ3).
However, a failure of Ij can also be caused by node i misreporting values Pin, Pi, Vi, and θi
or ϕ5. Of course, node i could also misreport only the values for Pin, Pi, Vi, and θi, or
pattern ϕ4, but that is essentially the same attack. Therefore, for this case we need to show
that ϕ5 and ψ1 are MSDND(ES) secure.
1. ϕ5 xor ψ1 Ij and PB increased
2. /∃⊩ϕ5 (w) privacy
3. /∃⊩ψ1 (w) privacy
Therefore, this case is MSDND(ES) secure: w ⊢ [(ϕ5 xor ψ1)]∧w ⊧ [(/∃⊩ϕ5 (w)) ∧ (/∃⊩ψ1 (w))].
Case 26.3. Node k can launch an attack such that the source is MSDND(ES) secure.
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The two patterns, psi3 and κ1 are obviously the same and MSDND(ES) secure by
reasoning similar to node j.
Case 26.4. The center node ℓ of the segment cannot launch an attack such that the source
is MSDND(ES) secure.
The patterns of invariant failure caused by node ℓ are unique. No attack launched by
a different malicious node is the same as the pattern for this node. Therefore, the clauses
required to show MSDND(ES) cannot be constructed. Given any contiguous set of seven
nodes on a single distribution line, it is possible to determine if the center node is malicious.
Case 26.5. Node m can launch an attack such that the source is MSDND(ES) secure.
The two patterns, alpha
3
and µ1 are obviously the same and MSDND(ES) secure by
reasoning similar to node j.
Case 26.6. Node n can launch an attack that is MSDND(ES) secure.
The proof is a mirror image of the proof for node j.
7.5. FORCING DEDUCIBILITY
The results of previous theorems can be used to force deducibility upon some of the
nodes of any arbitrary segment with more than six contiguous nodes on the smart grid. It is
necessary to create an outside verifier with access to the DGI messages, see Table 7.9, and
an independent measurement of the power on the distribution bus, see also Figure 7.5. By
running the algorithm given in Algorithm 1, anytime a power migration contract is made the












Figure 7.7. The Independent Verifier
Table 7.9. Message Types for Monitor Algorithm
mtype Message Purpose
a advertise(i) Advertise supply status
r request(i, x) Request power migration
s select(i, j, x) Select node for power contract
e end() Gracefully end algorithm
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Algorithm 10 Distributed Grid Intelligence Monitor Algorithm
1: procedure DGI MONITOR
2: var
3: mtype : character := NULL; ▷ See Table 7.9
4: msg : message := NULL;
5: n : integer := N ; ▷ N is the number of nodes
6: i, j : integer :=0,0;
7: PB , x : real :=0.0, 0.0;
8: C [n] [n] : real := 0.0; ▷ Power Migration Contract
9: RUN : boolean :=true;
10: NOP : empty statement, no operation;
11: begin
12: while RUN do




17: []mtype == a → NOP ;
18: []mtype == r → NOP ;
19: []mtype == s → DGIsel(i, j, x);





7.5.1. Comments on the Algorithms. Some explanation of the proposed algorithms
to be run on an independent verifier is in order. Technically, the algorithms are not part
of the FREEDM DGI, but are run on a verifier that can monitor the DGI messages and
can perform independent and direct measurements of the power state of the distribution bus
at the point where each house connects to the electrical smart grid. Measurements on the
public side of the house meters do not violate the privacy of the house owner. Algorithm
1, or DGI Monitor, monitors the message traffic in the DGI and spawns an independent
instance of Algorithm 2 DGISEL, to watch for a node to complete a migration contract. It
does this by periodically performing a secure power calculation11, Algorithm 3 or DGISPC,
of the expected power generation by the supply node. If this calculation does not show a
11This calculation could overload the verifier, so provisions are made to control how often this check is
done by using a system variable, tick, to determine the time interval between checks.
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power migration by the supply node within a system-wide predetermined timeout, an alert
is generated.
Algorithm 11 Distributed Grid Intelligence SELECT Algorithm
1: procedure DGISEL(integer i, integer j, real x)
2: var
3: ε : real := VARIANCE; ▷ system wide value
4: timeout : real :=TIMEOUT; ▷ system wide value
5: tick : real :=TICK; ▷ system wide value
6: time, t : real :=0,TIME; ▷ system wide value
7: PB, Pi, P0, Pcal : real :=0.0,0.0,0.0, 0.0;
8: passed : boolean :=false;
9: i, j : integer;
10: begin
11: Read PB;
12: P0 ∶= PB;
13: while ((time < timeout) ∧ (!passed) do
14: get Pi for time t from node i;
15: Pcal ∶= DGISPC(i, t, ε)
16: if (Pi ± ε) == Pcal then passed ∶=true;
17: end if
18: wait(tick);
19: time ∶= time + tick;
20: Read PB;
21: end while
22: if !passed then
23: ALERT(“NODE i FAILED ATTESTATION @ TIME t”);
24: Pi = Pcal





Algorithm 12 Secure Power Calculation
1: function DGISPC(integer t, real time, real ε)
2: var
▷ Xij =Xji and Rij = Rji
▷ Xij and Rij are known line characteristics
3: Xt−3,t−2, . . . ,Xt+2,t+3 : real;
4: Rt−3,t−2, . . . ,Rt+2,t+3 : real;
5: It−2, . . . It+2 : boolean;
6: Pˆt−2, . . . , Pˆt+2 : real;
7: Vt−3, . . . , Vt+3 : real;
8: θt−3, . . . , θt+3 : real;
9: X,R : real :=0.0,0.0;
10: Pcal : real;
11: i, j, k : integer;
12: term1, term2 :real :=0.0,0.0; ▷ Only for clarity
13: begin
14: get values {Pˆt−2, . . . , Pˆt+2} for given time;
15: get values {θt−3, . . . , θt+3} for given time;
16: get values {Xt−3, . . . ,Xt+3} for given lines;
17: for i ∶= t − 2 to t + 2 do
18: X ∶=Xi−1,i;
19: R ∶= Ri−1,i;
20: term1 ∶= R {Vi−1 − Vi cos (θi−1 − θi)}





23: term1 ∶= R {Vi−1 cos (θi−1 − θi) − Vi}





26: if Pi−1 + Pi − Pi,i1 < ε then
27: Ii ∶= true;
28: else
29: Ii ∶= false;
30: end if
31: end for
32: if (∼It−1 ∧ ∼It+1) ∨ (∼It ∧ (∀k ≠ t)(Ik)) then
33: Pt−1,t ∶= Pt−2,t−1 + Pˆt−1;
34: Pt,t+1 ∶= Pt+1,t+2 + Pˆt+1;
35: Pcal ∶= Pt,t+1 −Pt−1,t;
36: else







While much work has been reported in the literature on the proposed smart grid, there
is still much work to be done on grid security. Because the grid is a CPS, security is not
simply a matter of cyber security or physical security. The intertwining of the two leads
to a much more complex security problem. A malicious house on a common distribution
line could mount a fake power injection attack that could be nondeducible from the cyber
messaging and from physical measurements. Electrical power cannot easily be “signed” as
to its source. This work shows that in a small distribution network with fewer than seven
nodes, it is entirely feasible for a malicious node to launch a fake power injection attack that
would easily be detected by physical measurements, but the source could not be identified.
In the proposed smart grid as envisioned by the FREEDM Project, it is possible for a
malicious node to launch a fake power injection attack in such a way that the source of the
attack cannot be determined by purely cyber monitoring or purely physical monitoring. An
intelligent attacker could easily hide behind the privacy requirements of the system and the
inherent nondeducibility so introduced. Indeed, if the DGI trusts all the nodes, the attack
will be undetected and untraced; however, if there is doubt in the veracity of the messages
and reports of the readings from the nodes, an outside verification method, the proposed
verifier, could determine if one node in seven is malicious. The verifier would have enough
information to report back this fact and the identity of the attacker without violating the
privacy constraints of the system.
However, the smart grid is a CPS and the fact that the physical part of the system
can be observed can be used to break the nondeducibility of the attack by using the cyber
messages in combination with physical attestations to create a situation where the attack
would disrupt the physical invariants in a unique pattern if a verifier has access to the
measurements reported by seven nodes. If the attacker is naive or if the attacker is clever,
the verifier can still use attestation to form invariants and determine the source of the attack.
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Indeed, the verifier can use the same information to calculate the correct value for the power
generated by the attacker without violating the privacy of any house. Using this method,
a network of at least seven houses is safe from the single center node attempting a fake
power injection attack. If more nodes form the electrical smart grid grouping, the set of
seven concurrent nodes can be relabeled to allow all but the three nodes on either the input
or output side of the group to be individually verified. This technique shows promise for the
possible extension to other network topologies. However, such an extension is outside the
scope of this work.
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9. DISCUSSION
A few simple examples of MSDND(ES) will help to more clearly explain how it can
be applied and what sorts of information it can reveal. While designed for complex systems,
MSDND(ES) can also be applied to simple situations. In order to look at MSDND(ES)
and the ramifications, a few small “thought experiments”, or “gedankenversuch”, might be
helpful.
9.1. GEDANKEN OR THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
In Section 3.3.4 a simple polynomial time reduction is presented to model any
Sutherland ND(ES) using Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility. The situation is
not symmetric. MSDND(ES) can model any ND(ES) situation, but the reverse is not the
case. There are problems that are MSDND(ES) secure where ND(ES) is indeterminate.
One such case is the Gedanken experiment, “The Two Coin Dilemma” presented here.
9.1.1. Sutherland ND(ES). To demonstrate Sutherland ND(ES), it is helpful to
perform a “Thought Experiment” that could easily be done as a real world demonstration.
Imagine two security experts, Hal and Lou, waiting for a conference to begin. To pass the
time, the two decide to explore nondeducibility by matching quarters. They agree that if
they flip matching results (ϕ), heads-heads or tails-tails, Hal gets both quarters. If not, Lou
gets both.
To make it more interesting, the two decide to demonstrate to everyone nondeducibil-
ity as they flip quarters. Hal flips his coin in the usual way and hides the result from Lou.
Lou flips his coin on the table for all to see.
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Let:
QH(w) Hal’s quarter (either “heads” or “tails”)
QL(w) Lou’s quarter
ϕ = (QH(w) =′′ heads′′ ∧QL(w) =′′ heads′′) ∨ (QH(w) =′′ tail′′ ∧QL(w) =′′ tails′′)
wm ∈W The Kripke frame worlds on which the quarters match
wn ∈W The Kripke frame worlds on which the quarters do not match
VH(w) Hal’s valuation function of which world (essentially the valuation of ϕ)
VL(w) Lou’s valuation function of which world (essentially the valuation of ϕ).
H,T Hal’s coin “heads” or “tails”
h, t Lou’s coin “heads’ or “tails”
∣X trace restrictor, restricts the trace to security domain X
Tr set of all valid traces
τX System trace seen by X
τ ∈ Tr a particular valid trace
For this experiment, ND(ES) holds for Lou if:
(∀z ∈ {heads, tails} ,∃wm ∈W ∶ V
−1
H (z) = wm)∧[∃wn ∈W ∶ (VH(wn) = z) ∧ (VL(wm) = VL(wn))] .
(9.1)
Theorem 27. Who wins, the quarters match or do not match, is not ND(ES) from Hal.
Modal Proof.
Because Hal can see his quarter, his evaluation of match/mismatch depends solely upon
the value of Lou’s quarter. Without loss of generality, assume Hal has flipped “heads”. Hal
therefore knows that if Lou has flipped “heads”, w = wM and w = wN otherwise. From his
viewpoint, Hal can deduce the outcome.
Case 27.1. Lou flips “heads”.
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1. QH(w) = heads Hal has flipped heads
2. QL(w) = heads Lou has flipped heads
3. w = wm → ϕ The coins match and Hal deduces he wins.
Case 27.2. Lou flips “tails”.
1. QH(w) = heads Hal has flipped heads
2. QL(w) = tails Lou has flipped tails
3. w = wn → ∼ϕ The coins do not match and Hal deduces he loses.
In either case, Hal is able to correctly deduce the outcome. Therefore; who wins, the
quarters match or do not match, is not ND(ES) from Hal.
Trace Based Proof.
The trace based proof follows the same reasoning.
Theorem 28. The state of ϕ, or the match/mismatch of the coins, is ND(ES) from Lou.
Proof.
Without loss of generality, assume Hal has flipped heads. The proof can be divided into two
cases depending upon what Lou has flipped.
Case 28.1. Lou flips “heads”.
1. QH = heads Hal has flipped heads
2. QL = heads Lou has flipped heads
3. w = wm → ϕ The coins match and Hal deduces he wins
4. VL(wm) = QL = heads Lou’s coin is “heads” if they match
5. VL(wn) = QL = heads Lou’s coin is “heads” if they don’t match
6. VL(wm) = VL(wn) Lou sees the same thing in either case
7. ϕ is ND(ES) ϕ is nondeducible for Lou.
Case 28.2. Lou flips “tails”.
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1. QH = heads Hal has flipped heads
2. QL = tails Lou has flipped tails
3. w = wn → ∼ϕ The coins do not match and Hal deduces he loses
4. VL(wm) = QL = tails Lou’s coin is “tails” if they match
5. VL(wn) = QL = tails Lou’s coin is “tails” if they don’t match
6. VL(wm) = VL(wn) Lou sees the same thing in either case
7. ϕ is ND(ES) ϕ is nondeducible for Lou.
In either case, Lou is unable to correctly deduce the outcome. Therefore, ND(ES)
holds for Lou.
Alternate Trace Based Proof.
Hal sees he has flipped “heads” but no one else has seen Hal’s coin. After Lou flips his coin
for all to see, there are two valid possibilities which are known to Hal.
Case 28.3. Lou flips “heads”.
The set of valid traces for Lou is reduced to Tr = {Hh,Th}. When the trace restrictor
is applied to each trace the results are [({Hh} ∣L = h) ∧ ({Th} ∣L = h)] → τL = {h}.
Regardless of what Hal has flipped, Lou sees only {h}.
Case 28.4. Lou flips “tails”.
The set of valid traces Lou can see is reduced to Tr = {Ht,T t}. When the trace
restrictor is applied to each trace the results are [({Ht} ∣L = t) ∧ ({T t} ∣L = t)] → τL = {t}.
Regardless of what Hal has flipped, Lou sees only {t}.
Therefore, in either case Lou has no information about what Hal has rolled and the theorem,
‘The state match/mismatch is ND(ES) from Lou.” holds.
Suppose the game is changed to have Hal flip his coin on the table while Lou hides
his result. The nondeducibility, ND(ES) of ϕ, is simply reversed.
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Theorem 29. The results are the same if Lou flips his coin the regular way and Hal flips his
onto the table.
Proof. The reasoning is an exact mirror of Theorem 27 and Theorem 28 and is not given
here.
An interesting situation occurs if both look at their coins, but do not announce the results.
In this case, ND(ES) is symmetric and holds for both Hal and Lou at the same time. This
result was hinted at by Sutherland and McLean [8] [7].
Theorem 30. Sutherland’s ND(ES) is symmetric if both hide their coins after looking at
them.
Proof.
1. ND(ES) holds for Lou by Theorem 28
2. ND(ES) holds for Hal by Theorem 29
3. ND(ES) is symmetric
Therefore, Sutherland’s ND(ES) is symmetric if both hide their coins after looking at them.
9.1.2. The Two Coin Dilemma. But what if Hal and Lou agree to both flip their
coins and pause without looking at their coins? What is the state of ND(ES) before Lou or
Hal know their results? This changes the situation dramatically. Does ND(ES) hold for both
Hal and Lou or neither of them?
Theorem 31. Sutherland ND(ES) cannot be evaluated until either Hal or Lou looks at their
coin.
It has already been shown that once Hal or Lou sees their own coin, ND(ES) holds for
that person. The dilemma collapses into simple ND(ES) at that point.
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Proof.
Without loss of generality, for Hal the first clause of Sutherland ND(ES) is: (∀z ∈
{heads, tails} ,∀w ∈ W ∶ V −1H (z) = w). However, Hal is unable to perform the evaluation
VH(w) to determine the outcome of this clause. ND(ES) neither holds nor fails, it simply
cannot be applied. From Lou’s viewpoint, the same reasoning holds and there is a symmetric
failure of Sutherland’s ND(ES).
Trace Based Proof. Recall from Section 2.3, equation 2.4 the definition of trace based
ND(ES) is: ND(ES) = ∀τL, τH ∈ Tr ∶ ∃τ ∈ Tr ∶ τ ∣L = τL∣L ∧ τ ∣HI = τH ∣H (equation 2.4).
No one has seen either coin, so from either Hal’s or Lou’s security domain, the trace is
empty because no input or output actions have occurred.
This is an interesting situation. Looking at equation 2.4 one clause at a time must
indicate the status of ND(ES). τH , τL, and τ are all empty and by definition elements of any
set, specifically Tr. Any restrictor applied to an empty trace will return a result of empty. It
would appear that ND(ES) is vacuously true. It is logically correct to infer anything at all.
Apparently ND(ES) has broken down and cannot be evaluated until the trace is populated
with something.
Once Hal knows either “heads” or “tails”, Sutherland ND(ES) holds for Lou and not
Hal as before. But ND(ES) cannot even be evaluated before either knows their results.
Intuitively, the result must be nondeducible, but how can ND(ES) be constructed to reflect
the situation? ND(ES) relies upon the ability to perform the implied evaluation of both
events by something in the model, even if that is only some phenomenon. Lacking any
evaluation, ND(ES) breaks down.
9.1.3. Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility MSDND(ES). Now, suppose
Hal and Lou use MSDND(ES) to analyze the same game. Notice, by the definition
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of a logical statement the condition ϕ xor ∼ϕ must hold. We can simplify all proofs
of MSDND(ES) for ϕ to showing the final clause, /∃ Vϕ(w). For simplicity, the same
nomenclature will be used as before. In the first game where Hal flips his coin and looks at
it before he announces the result but Lou flips his on the table for all to see, MSDND(ES)
holds for Lou if:
(∀w ∈W )(ϕ xor ∼ϕ) ∧ [w ⊧ ◻(/∃ VL(ϕ))]. (9.2)
Notice: by the definition of a logical statement, the condition ϕ xor ∼ϕ must hold. This
means MSDND(ES) can be simplified to showing the final clause,/∃ Vϕ(w) is true.
As before, the situation for Hal mirrors that of Lou. After the first flip:
Theorem 32. The state match/mismatch is not MSDND(ES) from Hal.
Proof. Because Hal can see his quarter, his evaluation of match/mismatch depends solely
upon the value of Lou’s quarter. Without loss of generality, assume Hal has flipped “heads”.
Hal therefore knows that if Lou has flipped “heads”, w = wM . From his viewpoint, Hal can
deduce the outcome.
Case 32.1. Lou flips “heads”.
1. QH(w) = heads Hal has flipped heads
2. QL(w) = heads Lou has flipped heads
3. w = wm → ϕ The coins match and Hal deduces he wins.
Case 32.2. Lou flips “tails”.
1. QH(w) = heads Hal has flipped heads
2. QL(w) = tails Lou has flipped tails
3. w = wn → ∼ϕ The coins do not match and Hal deduces he loses.
In either case, Hal is able to correctly deduce the outcome. Therefore, MSDND(ES)
does not hold for Hal because Hal possesses a valuation function for ϕ→ ∃VH(ϕ).
116
Theorem 33. The state match/mismatch is MSDND(ES) from Lou.
Proof.
Case 33.1. Lou flips “heads”.
1. QH = heads Hal has flipped heads
2. QL = heads Lou has flipped heads
3. w = wm → ϕ The coins match and Hal deduces he wins
4. VL(wm) = QL = heads Lou’s coin is “heads” if they match
5. VL(wn) = QL = heads Lou’s coin is “heads” if they don’t match
6. VL(wm) = VL(wn) Lou sees the same thing in either case
7. /∃ Vϕ(w) and ϕ is nondeducible for Lou.
Case 33.2. Lou flips “tails”.
1. QH = heads Hal has flipped heads
2. QL = tails Lou has flipped tails
3. w = wn → ∼ϕ The coins do not match and Hal deduces he loses
4. VL(wm) = QL = tails Lou’s coin is “tails” if they match
5. VL(wn) = QL = tails Lou’s coin is “tails” if they don’t match
6. VL(wm) = VL(wn) Lou sees the same thing in either case
7. /∃ Vϕ(w) and ϕ is nondeducible for Lou.
In either case, Lou is unable to correctly deduce the outcome. Therefore, MSDND(ES)
ϕ holds for Lou.
Apparently, Sutherland ND(ES) and MSDND(ES) produce the same result. This is to
be expected because it has already been shown that Sutherland ND(ES) can be reduced in
polynomial time to MSDND(ES). But what about the game where neither Hal or Lou look
at their coin? At that point, MSDND(ES) holds for both Hal and Lou.




Without lose of generality, assume Hal flips “heads”. At this point, Hal does not know he
flipped “heads”.
Case 34.1. Lou flips “heads” but does not know it.
1. QH =′′ heads′′ Hal has flipped “heads” but does not know that.
2. QL =′′ heads′′ Lou has flipped “heads” but does not know that.
3. /∃ QH →/∃ VH(w)→/∃ VH(ϕ) Hal cannot know who won.
Case 34.2. Lou flips “tails” but does not know it.
1. QH =′′ heads′′ Hal has flipped “heads” but does not know that.
2. QL =′′ heads′′ Lou has flipped “tails” but does not know that.
3. /∃ QH →/∃ VH(w)→/∃ VH(ϕ) Hal cannot know who won.
Hal does not have a valuation function for ϕ, /∃ VH(ϕ), and therefore MSDND(ES) for
ϕ holds for Hal. Mirror reasoning leads to the same conclusion for Lou. Again, a symmetric
result as is expected.
Theorem 35. Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility holds for Lou before either looks
at their coin.
Proof.
The proof mirrors the same logic as Theorem 34
9.1.4. Schro¨dinger’s Cat and ND(ES). In discussing this famous Gedanken
experiment, mathematics and physics will be kept to a minimum. This will lead to some
bending of the exact nature of the experiment. However, this can be tolerated because the
intent is to look at information flow, not wave mechanics. The background will be kept as
brief as possible.
In the experiment, see Figure 9.1, a box is constructed with a deadly vial of cyanide
suspended above a vat of acid. If a specific atom of uranium undergoes spontaneous fission,
the vial is dropped into the acid and the generated gas kills the cat. This fission event is
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Figure 9.1. Schro¨dinger’s Cat
unpredictable and totally random. The cat is placed in the box and the box is sealed in such
a way to cut off its contents from any and all interactions with the universe. Before the box
is sealed, the contents have a wave function, Ψcat, that is part of the wave function of the
universe, ΨU . When the box is sealed, the two wave functions are uncoupled and cannot
interact with each other. (This is key for quantum mechanical reasons that are unimportant
to this discussion.) Time passes both inside and outside of the box.
Dr. Schro¨dinger posed the famous question: is the cat alive or dead? For purposes of
discussion, let ϕ be “The cat breathed five minutes after the box was closed.”; that is, the cat
was alive and did something. Because the box is sealed off completely from the universe,
the wave function inside the box is decoupled from the universe, the cat is neither alive
nor dead but somehow a combination of the two until the box is opened (and the two wave
functions couple again, technically the cat’s state collapses to either alive or dead) or in any
way interacts with the universe.
This presents two completely partitioned security domains, Dr. Schro¨dinger (and
the universe) SDS and the cat (and everything inside the box) SDC . For the sake of
discussion, assume many different things happen while the box is closed. In SDS inputs
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and outputs happen until the box is finally opened (BoxOpen). The states can be labeled
s1, s2, . . . , sn, . . . ,BoxOpen, although the detailed states are not of interest until state
BoxOpen where the box is opened. In SDC the events are problematic. Because of the
nature of the experiment, nothing can be said about the events inside the box. The quantum
states are not collapsed and therefore any statements involving the events are indeterminate
at best until . . . ,BoxOpen at which point the previous events inside the box have meaning.
Theorem 36. Before the box is closed, events inside the box are not ND(ES) secure from
the universe.
Proof. Obviously, Dr. Schro¨dinger can walk over and look into the box. On a more
technical level, Ψcat is coupled with ΨU and therefore observable by some means.
Theorem 37. While the box is closed off from the universe, it is not possible to determine if
the events inside are ND(ES) secure from the universe.
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose the theorem is false, then it is reasonable to decide the cat is
either alive (ϕ) or dead (∼ϕ)12.
Let:
ϕ be ”The cat breathed five minutes ago.”
∼ϕ be ”The cat has not breathed for five minutes.”
SDS be the security domain of the outside universe and Dr. Schro¨dinger.
SDC be the security domain of the box and the cat.
VSϕ(w) be the Dr. Schro¨dinger’s valuation of ϕ.
VCϕ(w) be the cat’s valuation of ϕ.




′) = z ∧ (VSϕ(w) = V
S
ϕ(w
′)) . But for Dr. Schro¨dinger to evaluate
the state of ϕ, he must somehow see inside the box. This violates the terms of the
experiment. For the cat to let it be known that it is breathing, it must communicate with
the outside world which also violates the experiment. This is a contradiction, therefore the
12This is where the discussion does not exactly follow quantum mechanics.
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theorem is true and it is not possible to determine the ND(ES) state of the events inside the
box.
Remarks 2. Most situations where ND(ES) is evaluated require that one partition or the
other have a “god’s” view of both partitions. This allows information to flow from the LOW
partition to the HIGH partition.
Theorem 38. While the box is closed off from the universe, it is possible to determine if the
events inside are MSDND(ES) secure from the universe.
Proof.
Let:
ϕ be ”The cat breathed five minutes ago.”
∼ϕ be ”The cat has not breathed for five minutes.”
SDS be the security domain of the outside universe and Dr. Schro¨dinger.
SDC be the security domain of the box and the cat.
VSϕ(w) be the Dr. Schro¨dinger’s valuation of ϕ.
VCϕ(w) be the cat’s valuation of ϕ.
1. ϕ xor ∼ϕ def. of wff
2. ∼∃VSϕ(w) terms of the experiment
By sets 1 and 2:
∀w inW ∶ w ⊢ (ϕ xor ∼ϕ) ∧ (w ⊧ (∼∃VSϕ(w))).
The state of the cat cannot be determined by Dr. Schro¨dinger without violating the
experiment, but the state is MSDND(ES) secure.
Remarks 3. Most situations where ND(ES) is evaluated require one partition or the other
have a “god’s” view of both partitions. This allows information to flow from the LOW
partition to the HIGH partition.
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9.1.5. Results of Gedankenversuch. These little thought experiments, “gedanken-
versuch”, show that Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility produces correct results
when Sutherland’s ND(ES) cannot even provide any results. This is a critical result for this
dissertation. This dissertation has already shown that MSDND(ES) can easily model any
system where Sutherland’s nondeducibility holds. If it had turned out that the reverse is true,
that ND(ES) could model any system that can be modeled by MSDND(ES), then the only
hope for the dissertation is to show that the new method is easier to implement. Instead,
this dissertation shows that MSDND(ES) can indeed model systems where traditional
nondeducibility cannot be evaluated.
This dissertation has a very simple idea at its heart: cyber security methods do not
work well for CPS nor do physical security methods. What is needed is an entirely different
point of view. To secure a CPS the cyber system must be secured, the physical system must
be secured, information flows must be secured and controlled, and lastly the knowledge
leaked to an outside agent who is able to simply observe the CPS must also be understood
and secured. Even so, there is no guarantee that nothing has been missed.
The more traditional security methods are useful to understand the actors, subjects and
objects, as well as any inherent security domains of the system. These traditional methods
are not enough to insure the security of a CPS, but many times they can address the needs
of the cyber side of the system. A quick modeling of the system usually leads to false starts
and retracing of steps already done, but the effort can lead to critical insights into the nature
of the CPS.
9.2. LABELED TRANSITION SYSTEMS
It is tempting to create a security model for a CPS over a Labeled Transition System
(LTS); however, this is problematic when dealing with even simple real world systems. To
correctly build the frame F all the possible transitions must be defined. Even denoting all
the possible states to build a single world is difficult in the real world, but trying to correctly
determine all the possible changes and the corresponding transitions is virtually impossible.
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There are only two reasonable ways to deal with the complexity of the transitions, either
simplify the model until very few transitions are possible or allow all transitions to occur.
If the transitions are known and an LTS can be built, the modal operators take on a
different form and become directly related to the labeled transitions. Briefly, ◻ϕ becomes
[i]ϕ where i is the number of transitions in the statement. The ◇ϕ operator becomes ⟨i⟩ϕ in
the same manner. The behavior of an LTS is drastically different from a complete transition
frame. Because it is rarely useful to denote all the allowed states and transitions for a CPS,
this dissertation, and indeed MSDND itself, is based solely upon complete transition Kripke
frames thus removing the requirement to build complex transition tables or diagrams.
9.3. TIME AND TRACES IN KRIPKE FRAMES
While it does not have a strict bearing upon this dissertation, the concepts of time and
system traces of a model built over Kripke frames is interesting. There are two obvious
ways to deal with time that can produce an acceptable system trace.
9.3.1. Time as a State Variable. If time is treated as a state variable, the passage
of time causes a transition from one world w to another w′ on the frame. A corresponding
change to a different state variable, for example “the brakes are applied”, would lead to
another transition where the time would not change. A model built upon this type of view
would closely resemble a grand canonical ensemble of essentially static states joined by both
time and state change transitions. A trace could be produced by following the transitions as
one would expect.
9.3.2. Time as Purely Transitional. Another possibility would be to look at every
“tick” of the system as forcing a transition. If the granularity of the “ticks” is small
enough, such a rigid system could usefully model a CPS, but a method must be found
to deal with time when the system is at rest. If each “tick” forces a transition, that is
w1Rw2,w2Rw3, . . ., then the simple solution would be to allow a time transition to return
to the same world which would leave all state variable values unchanged. In this view, a
trace could be manufactured by following the transitions in a strict time order as one would
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expect. Obviously, the choice of methods to deal with time must be independent of the
actual CPS and the choice would be made based solely upon which view of time is most
useful.
9.4. THE ADVANTAGES OF MSDND(ES)
The main advantages of MSDND(ES) fall into two main categories, usefulness
and semantics. This method can describe models that cannot be easily described with
Sutherland’s ND and handle constraints that could otherwise interfere with the usefulness of
the model. On the other hand, MSDND(ES) allows the model to examine difficult questions
with less semantic distance than many other methods and with quite a bit of flexibility.
Another intriguing possibility of MSDND(ES) is the possibility of localizing the actual
source of information flow by analyzing a trace to determine where a breach has occurred.
Unfortunately, this will have to wait for future work.
9.5. EXTENDED NONDEDUCIBILITY
Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility can be trace based, but it was not
designed that way. Traced based security can require the model to be run multiple times
in order to examine the trace under different conditions. True, this could be done by trace
restrictors such as used in NI or NF, but this is not required. Because MSDND is based
upon a Kripke frame, there is no need to wait for the completion of a set of system actions
to examine a trace. It is possible with some models to examine the MSDND(ES) status of
the system as it evolves. This allows for the possibility of future systems that automatically
perform actions to help hide internal actions [58] in order to minimize the information flow
when the physical side of the CPS is observed.
Some systems forbid access to sensitive information to preserve privacy such as the
proposed electrical smart grid [19]. A homeowner may very well want to preserve his
or her privacy by refusing to allow his neighbors to read the meter attached to his or her
house to determine the precise electrical generation and/or demand. This makes traditional
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information flow security difficult, or impossible, to evaluate, see Sections 7 and 9.1.
Sutherland ND(ES) cannot be evaluated in these situations but MSDND(ES) can.
9.6. STRONG AND WEAK NONDEDUCIBILITY
Another view of the relationship between Sutherland’s Nondeducibility and MSDND(ES)
is to look at the constraints upon the systems each can model. In order to evaluate ND(ES),
either the system must be constrained to a limited number of well defined traces or to
a specific type of Kripke frame where all values on all worlds can be evaluated. This
is a relatively strong model and works very well in describing most CPS. But CPS are
sometimes not very well defined or have components that are not completely understood at
the time the model is constructed. This leads to the distinct possibility that some transitions
may not be correctly modeled leading to traces that were not expected or to the possibility
that a required logical expression might not have an associated valuation in the model. In
these cases, ND(ES) will fail to properly model the actual system as was seen in the example
of the drive-by-wire automobile, see Section 5.
MSDND(ES) is a weaker model than ND(ES) with fewer constraints. Because
MSDND(ES) has fewer constraints, it is more useful in situations where the system is not
well-behaved or not as well understood. For example, MSDND(ES) is shown to produce
a model that behaves more like the CPS of the drive-by-wire automobile. MSDND(ES) is
better able to model systems where the constraints of the system do not allow for some of the
valuation functions required such as the electrical smart grid as presented in Section 7, the
coin flip game presented in Section 9.1.2, or Schro¨dinger’s Cat presented in Section 9.1.4.
In all of these cases, the constraints of the actual CPS do not allow some of the desired
valuation functions and therefore present serious problems for Sutherland’s ND(ES). A
weaker model with fewer constraints, MSDND(ES), is required.
This relationship of a weaker to a stronger model also explains why it is possible
to reduce Sutherland’s ND(ES) to a weaker MSDND(ES) because this is a relaxation of
constraints. This should not be taken as a criticism of ND(ES) but more as an extension of
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Nondeducibility from the purely cyber field of system security to a broader usefulness in
the study of CPS.
9.7. MSDND(ES) AND SEMANTIC DISTANCE
Early efforts to describe CPS required the system to be defined in rigid terms. HRU
requires the system to be deconstructed into subjects, objects, and rights. The actions
performed upon these entities were limited and in some cases irreversible. While this
produces useful results in some limited cases, the model does not clearly reflect the system
under examination. The semantic distance is large. The rigid model produced does not
correspond well with the conceptual view of the system. The BLP, Lipner, and Biba models
with their added complexity bring the model more in line with the conceptual system, but
still leave much to be desired when applied to CPS . These systems were never meant to
deal with information flows and physically observable systems.
Information flow security models do much towards closing the semantic distance
between the model and the conceptual system. These systems relax the rigid requirements of
the earlier models while allowing one to examine the more subtle ways in which information
flows can disrupt security. In short, the question set that can be answered is much richer.
Nondeducibility and Multiple Security Domains Nondeducibility close the semantic
gap even more than other information flow security models. These models can formulate,
and answer, a question set that is richer and much closer to both the conceptual CPS and
the actual CPS . Because the valuations are more flexible, virtually any question that can be
framed as a logical expression can be dealt with.
9.8. MSDND(ES), ND(ES), AND LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION
When dealing with conceptual models of actual CPS issues of semantic abstraction
levels become increasingly important. S. I. Hayakawa introduced the concept of the ladder
of abstraction [60], see chapter 10, to deal with different levels of semantic abstraction in
a clearer manner than Alfred Korzybski’s structural differential [61] [62]. The historical
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security models in Section 2 are constrained to deal with questions on a single abstraction
level, typically the level closest to the model. This is too simplistic for information flows,
especially when considering interactions between the CPS and society. Both ND(ES)
and MSDND(ES) are designed to deal with valuations on Kripke frames regardless of
the level of semantic abstraction. This allows Nondeducibility techniques expressed over
Kripke frames to deal with questions of information flow between different levels of
semantic abstraction by framing the questions involved as simple or compound logical
expression. This is particularly useful when ND(ES) and MSDND(ES) are extended into
other disciplines and not limited to CPS. Traditional cyber security methods cannot be
extended in this manner.
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10. CONCLUSIONS
10.1. TRADITIONAL SECURITY METHODS
As stated numerous times in this dissertation, the traditional security methods such as
HRU, BLP, Lipner, NF, and NI are not sufficient to secure most CPS. However, these tools
are vital for developing the cyber security necessary for total security of CPS and are key to
creating a structure capable of resisting attacks. Working through the process of correctly
using these tools can be tedious and prone to redundant efforts; however, persistent effort
on this phase is key to building a useful model.
Information flow security is critical in CPS. Early attempts to deal with the issues
of IFS such as Noninterference and Noninference provide a way to model simple attacks
with effects that are obvious. However, attackers are becoming more sophisticted and
so are the methods to model more subtle information flows. Sutherland introduced the
idea of Nondeducibility as a model built over a Kripke frame using modal logic methods.
This dissertation discusses a new method of nondeducibility, MSDND(ES), and presents a
polynomial time method to reduce any model that is ND(ES) to one that is MSDND(ES).
This method is used to examine models of a number of different MSDND(ES).
10.2. PHYSICAL SECURITY CLUES
All CPS can be observed. This apparent weakness can be shown to be a very useful
tool when properly understood. If the cyber security is viewed with the correct level of “trust
but verify”, physical observations can be paired with cyber monitoring to provide physical
attestations, but there must be the understanding that cyber security alone is not the answer
to every security problem. The operator (human) or the security monitoring system must
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be willing to use the physical system to verify the cyber system. This key point of social
engineering was one of the key reasons the Stuxnet attack was successful.
10.3. BIT/BUT MODAL LOGIC AND CPS
The BIT logic introduced by Liau [9] proves very useful in discussing the role of
trust, either human or computer agent, in CPS. In much of the literature, when trust or
belief is discussed, it can take pages of text to explain relatively simple concepts. With
BIT or BUT logic, these complex trust/belief relationships can be treated mathematically
which not only reduces the amount of text used, but can translate imprecise language into a
symbolic language amenable to mathematical proofs. This clarity facilitates the discovery
of new information.
10.4. DRIVE-BY-WIRE AUTOMOBILE
Like most modern automobiles, the Toyota Prius as a drive-by-wire system can present
some interesting security issues. The system fits the multi-level BLP model, but the
requirements for a more secure subject to lower its security level to make the system function
implies a large amount of trust in the entity. In the Lipner model the Corporation subject is
not trusted, resulting in the system operations being inconsistent with known operations.
Both Noninference and Nondeducibility are information flow models that describe the
ability of the driver to ascertain how the vehicle is being operated. Specifically, the system
is Nondeducibility secure with respect to the driver which means the driver cannot ascertain
if Corporation remote operations or the Car is controlling the behavior.
If the owner subscribes to OnStar, Toyota Safety Connect, or some similar service,
the driver must trust the service. We have shown that in hazardous situations or in remote
operations the driver is not in control of the automobile. There is nothing the driver can do
in these situations but trust that all is well. Such concerns spread beyond the systems studied
here; the recent Stuxnet worm [15] had a similar effect of blinding the system operator from
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the actual CPS operation. As such, this dissertation’s analysis is indicative of the type of
analysis needed before large-scale adoption of cyber-physical services.
This section models a particular CPS, the drive-by-wire automobile using an number
of security models from BLP to the IFS models such as Noninterference, Noninference,
and trace-based Nondeducibility. If a model is used that does not take into account IFS,
the results do not clearly describe the observed actions of the CPS. The IFS models more
closely reflect the reality of the drive-by-wire automobile, but there are still issues.
The models as presented are all trace based. The CPS must be closely followed
through the actions of interest and then the trace can be examined to insure that the particular
IFS holds. For both NI and ND the model must be run twice under different security
conditions and the resulting traces compared. Trace based information flow models do
not offer the promise of real-time analysis of CPS.
As noted in Section 2.3, Sutherland Nondeducibility can best be expressed as a modal
frame based model rather than a trace based model. With frame based ND models, the
requirement to run the model multiple times can be relaxed. This would seem to eliminate
all of the major issues with ND but in many cases it does not. Sutherland’s ND requires the
model to contain potential valuation functions for all wff for all worlds. This is often not
the case with CPS. If valuation functions are missing, the model fails and ND cannot be
determined one way or the other.
10.5. MSDND
The traditional view of security, the idea of “walling the bad guys out”, is too
simplistic. Viewing security domains as wholly contained within a threat space or within a
less secure domain is inadequate as are the available tools. Restricting models to idealized
partitions does not work well with cyber physical systems.
We have shown that multiple security domains, without the necessity of ideal
partitions, is a more realistic model. We have shown that in CPS information leaks
throughout the model by observation of the physical actions of the system. Our new
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definition of MSDND(ES) can model traditional Nondeducibility as well as provide a
definition of Nondeducibility that holds in CPS. Specifically, MSDND(ES) can easily model
situations where critical information flow from one security domain to another is disrupted
or denied altogether as in the Stuxnet worm attack.
We applied our model to a specific CPS, a drive-by-wire automobile, under real world
conditions. Our model fits the CPS better than traditional Nondeducibility because it does
not require us to partition the system into idealized domains that do not allow information
flow between domains. Indeed, our model does not even need to address how the security
domains interact once they have been properly defined. We have shown that we can relax
the requirements of absolute domain partitioning and still model the system.
Furthermore, we have shown that since MSDND(ES) does not depend upon the
ability to evaluate information flow between distinct and absolute partitions, our model
does not require building complicated decision variables nor does it require access to the
total input/output of the model. By relaxing the boundary conditions of the model, results
are obtained by modal methods.
10.6. STUXNET
MSDND(ES) and BIT logic can be used to model Stuxnet type attacks. Such attacks
rely on MSDND(ES) and the inherent trust placed in the components of CPS to hide critical
information from electronic monitoring and from human operators. Others [14] have
discussed how difficult it is to thwart specifically targeted attacks such as APTs. Because
Stuxnet-like attacks do not make an effort to steal information, there is no need for the virus
to connect with the INTERNET. Therefore, monitoring out-bound traffic does not help.
Because such an attack replays valid readings, any effort to find problems through
internal inconsistencies is also doomed. It is not feasible to eliminate the human components
in large scale operations of CPS; therefore APT attacks will often be successful via social
engineering. Once such a virus is in place, detection is complicated by human trust in
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electronic systems. If we expect the electronic monitoring to give us correct results, a low-
level attack on the physical sensor-monitor communications such as Stuxnet will succeed.
The importance of Corollary 6.6.1 is clear. All CPS must also have physical
monitoring that can be used to verify the operation of the electronic monitoring or the next
Stuxnet type attack will also succeed. Verifying cyber security with low level physical
monitoring can break the role of trust in MSDND attacks. In the case of Stuxnet, the simple
addition of a physical read-out of the actual speed of the centrifuge would have broken the
attack model if the human operator distrusted the cyber monitoring enough to verify the
readings on the monitor.
Stuxnet type attacks can be broken. Consider the centrifuge system in light of
Corollaries 6.6.1 and 6.6.1. If the centrifuge is equipped with a physical speedometer in
addition to the cyber monitoring, the speedometer can be made to trip an audible alarm
or a cyber alarm with physical diversity from the normal monitoring/control system. For
example, the speedometer might close a hard-wired circuit to turn on a siren and flashing
red light. This is equivalent to all entities having direct access to the valuation function
V0ϕ(w). If this is true, then Theorem 6.6.1 holds and MSDND(ES) based attacks fail.
10.7. THE ELECTRICAL SMART GRID
While much work has been reported in the literature on the proposed smart grid, there
is still much work to be done on grid security. Because the grid is a CPS, security is not
simply a matter of cyber security or physical security. The intertwining of the two leads
to a much more complex security problem. A malicious house on a common distribution
line could mount a fake power injection attack that could be nondeducible from the cyber
messaging and from physical measurements. Electrical power cannot easily be “signed” as
to its source. This work shows that in a small distribution network with fewer than seven
nodes, it is entirely feasible for a malicious node to launch a fake power injection attack that
would easily be detected by physical measurements, but the source could not be identified.
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In the proposed smart grid as envisioned by the FREEDM Project, it is possible for a
malicious node to launch a fake power injection attack in such a way that the source of the
attack cannot be determined by purely cyber monitoring or purely physical monitoring. An
intelligent attacker could easily hide behind the privacy requirements of the system and the
inherent nondeducibility so introduced. Indeed, if the DGI trusts all the nodes, the attack
will be undetected and untraced; however, if there is doubt in the veracity of the messages
and reports of the readings from the nodes, an outside verification method, the proposed
verifier, could determine if one node in seven is malicious. The verifier would have enough
information to report back this fact and the identity of the attacker without violating the
privacy constraints of the system.
However, the smart grid is a CPS and the fact that the physical part of the system
can be observed can be used to break the nondeducibility of the attack by using the cyber
messages in combination with physical attestations to create a situation where the attack
would disrupt the physical invariants in a unique pattern if a verifier has access to the
measurements reported by seven nodes. If the attacker is naive or if the attacker is clever,
the verifier can still use attestation to form invariants and determine the source of the attack.
Indeed, the verifier can use the same information to calculate the correct value for the power
generated by the attacker without violating the privacy of any house. Using this method,
a network of at least seven houses is safe from the single center node attempting a fake
power injection attack. If more nodes form the electrical smart grid grouping, the set of
seven concurrent nodes can be relabeled to allow all but the three nodes on either the input
or output side of the group to be individually verified. This technique shows promise for the
possible extension to other network topologies. However, such an extension is outside the
scope of this work.
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